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INTRODUCTION 
 This article is about how Montana has determined the 
contours of the public’s right to use the waters of the state for 
recreation.  Pursuant to Montana’s Constitution, the Montana 
Supreme court has repeatedly applied the Public Trust Doctrine to 
waters that the state owns for the use of its people, holding that the 
public has the right to the recreational use of waters that are 
capable of recreational use, including the use of the beds and banks 
of streams and rivers, even where the beds and banks are privately 
owned.1 This article is primarily a chronological narrative of the 
remarkable development, adoption, and testing of the unique story 
surrounding stream access in Montana 
 This article will explore the early legal background, then the 
                                                 
1.  Mont. Coal. for Stream Access v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163 (Mont. 
1984); Mont. Coal. for Stream Access v. Hildreth, 684 P.2d 1088 (Mont. 1984); 
Mont. Const. art. IX, § 3(3). 
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seminal 1984 Montana cases, Curran2 and Hildreth,3 the subsequent 
adoption by the Montana Legislature in 1985 of the Stream Access 
Law4 (this common name will be used throughout the text), and the 
following testing and probing of the perimeters of the Stream 
Access Law’s principals and details in litigation and legislative 
effort.  In addition, a history and description of the executive 
branch’s implementation of the Stream Access Law and 
management of public recreational use of streams and rivers is 
undertaken.   
 The journey is an absorbing legal and political drama with a 
central thread of the broad and encompassing public right to use for 
recreation the water that Montana owns for the “use of its people.”5  
This long, fascinating, and successful history is chronicled from a 
legal perspective, although the story could also be told from a 
purely political and public participation perspective that was 
equally eventful and important.  In light of the scope of this article, 
that perspective is left for other storytellers.   
 The legal history of stream access in Montana is not by any 
means the whole story.  This author plans to submit a second, 
follow-up article that will examine Montana’s Stream Access Law 
through a comparison of how neighboring states have determined 
and limited public recreational rights, comparisons that highlight 
the unique approach, in significant respects, that Montana has 
taken.  The main thrust of this saga, thirty plus years in the making 
now, will provide the backdrop for comments on the law’s successes 
or short-comings, issues addressed, issues that will eventually need 
to be addressed, the recognition of potential future pitfalls and how 
to avoid them, and an assessment of the merits of Montana’s 
approach. This is illustrated by the intense interest of the public and 
riparian landowners, and is underscored in comparisons with 
neighboring states. 
 As a preliminary matter, the Stream Access Law and 
                                                 
2.  Curran, 682 P.2d 163. 
3.  Hildreth, 684 P.2d 1088. 
4.  1985 Mont. Laws ch. 556, 1127 (codified as Mont. Code Ann. 
§§ 23-2-301 to 322 (1985)).   
5.  Mont. Const. art. IX, § 3(3). 
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recreational use of streams, rivers, and lakes is administered 
primarily by the Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks6 
(“DFWP”) and the Montana Fish, Wildlife and Parks Commission7 
(“Commission”).  The roles of DFWP and the Commission will be 
detailed throughout this article.  
A. Navigable for Title and Navigable for Recreation 
 At the outset, it is important to distinguish the legal 
concepts of navigability for title and navigability for recreation.  
Navigability for title describes those rivers that are “navigable in 
fact” under federal law for state ownership of the underlying bed of 
the river.8  Navigable for recreation describes streams and rivers 
that the public has the right to use for recreation under state law 
and includes navigable for title rivers plus all other streams and 
rivers that Montana law has determined are available for public 
recreational use.9 
 The idea that states, as sovereigns, own the beds of 
navigable waters has its origins in English common law.10  Initially, 
the thirteen colonies were held to own the bed of navigable waters 
subject to the ebb and flow of the tide.11  The United States 
Supreme Court subsequently extended the concept of sovereign 
ownership by each of the thirteen original states to “all their 
navigable waters and the soils under them.”12  In addition, the title 
                                                 
6.  Mont. Code Ann. § 2-15-3401 (2013) (establishing the 
Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks). 
7.  Mont. Code Ann. § 2-15-3402 (2013) The name of the 
Commission was the Fish and Game Commission until the name was changed 
to the Fish, Wildlife and Parks Commission in 1991. See 1991 Mont. Laws ch. 
28 103 §1.  Then it changed to Fish and Wildlife Commission in 2013. See 2013 
Mont. Laws ch. 235 816 §6. However, the authority for the Commission 
relative to Stream Access Law did not change with the name changes. 
8.  PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1228 (2012). 
9.  Curran, 682 P.2d 163; Hildreth, 684 P.2d. 1088. 
10.  Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 13 (1894); PPL Mont., 132 S. Ct. 
at 1226-27. 
11.  PPL Mont., 132 S. Ct. at 1226-27. 
12.  Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. 367, 410 (1842). 
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to territorial lands under navigable water was declared to be held in 
trust for future states under the Equal Footing Doctrine.13  Through 
this doctrine, a state’s title to these lands is conferred by the United 
States Constitution.  Thus, “questions of navigability for 
determining state riverbed title are governed by federal law.”14   
 The United States Supreme Court opinion in The Daniel 
Ball15 case set the formula for determining navigability of water, 
stating:   
 
Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable 
rivers in law which are navigable in fact. And they 
are navigable in fact when they are used, or are 
susceptible of being used, in their ordinary 
condition, as highways for commerce, over which 
trade and travel are or may be conducted in the 
customary modes of trade and travel on water.16 
 
The Daniel Ball test is also used for the purposes of 
assessing federal regulatory authority and the applicability of 
specific federal statutes.  When used to determine state title under 
the Equal Footing Doctrine, the test is based on the “natural and 
ordinary” condition of the water at the time of statehood;17 depends 
only on navigation and does not require interstate commerce;18 is 
applied on a segment-by-segment basis with each segment judged 
as to whether the river is or is not navigable;19 and river segments 
are navigable for title only if they were used or were susceptible of 
use “as highways of commerce at the time of statehood.”20 
 In contrast, the concept of navigable for recreation is based 
on the Public Trust Doctrine, which has been held to be a matter of 
                                                 
13. Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 228-29 (1845). 
14.  PPL Mont., 132 S. Ct. at 1227. 
15.  The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557 (1871). 
16.  Id. at 563. 
17.  PPL Mont., 132 S. Ct. at 1228. 
18.  Id. at 1229. 
19.  Id. 
20. Id. at 1233. 
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state law.21  In summary: 
 
Under accepted principles of federalism, the states 
retain residual power to determine the scope of the 
public trust over water within their borders, while 
federal law determines riverbed title under the 
equal-footing doctrine.22 
I. STREAM ACCESS CASES AND STATUTES  
A. Pre-Curran and Hildreth 
 In 1895, the Montana Supreme Court in Gibson v. Kelly 
decided whether a riparian landowner to a navigable river owned to 
the ordinary low-water, or to the ordinary high-water mark.23  The 
property at issue in the case was along the Missouri River in 
Choteau County.  The defendant was occupying the low-water to 
high-water strip in front of the plaintiff’s land and was excluding the 
plaintiff from the property.  Ultimately, the plaintiff was seeking 
the court’s aid in ejecting this intruder.24 
 In its opinion, the Court acknowledged that the question of 
ownership varied among the states deciding the issue.25  The Court 
held that the riparian landowner owned to the low-water mark in 
view of the circumstances of the state.  Absent any other specific 
support, the Court reinforced its decision by explaining, “also for 
the reason that the rule just announced by decision will become, in 
a few months, the rule by statute.”26  The Court did not fully 
explain its conclusion; however, the holding made it easier to find 
that the intruder was trespassing and avoided a conflict with the 
new civil code. 
                                                 
21.  Id. at 1235. 
22.  Id. 
23.  Gibson v. Kelly, 39 P. 517 (Mont. 1895). 
24.  Id. at 517. 
25.  Id. at 518. 
26.  Id. at 519. The new civil code the court was referring to had 
been approved by the Governor and would become the law on July 1, 1895. 
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 The Court acknowledged that “the public [has] certain 
rights of navigation and fishery upon the river and upon the strip in 
question,” although the “rights of navigation or of fishing are not at 
all involved in these pleadings.”  Nevertheless, the court concluded 
the plaintiff owned the strip, “subject only to the public use of 
navigation and fishing.”27  Whether or not the court’s comments on 
the public’s right to use the strip for navigation and fishing are 
interpreted as dicta, the real defect of the Gibson decision lies in 
the lack of reasoning.  More specifically, it was left unclear how the 
Court and the legislature could concede to riparian landowners 
what otherwise would be public property. 
 The Civil Code of 1895 in section 1291, codified the rule 
that “the owner of the land, when it borders upon a navigable lake 
or stream, takes to the edge of the lake or stream at low-water 
mark.”28  The 1895 legislature, in the new civil code, claimed the 
state as owner of “all land below the water of a navigable lake or 
stream.”29  The 1895 Legislature, in adopting the Political Code of 
Montana, defined public ways as: “[n]avigable waters and all 
streams of sufficient capacity to transport the products of the 
country are public ways for the purposes of navigation and 
transportation.”30 
 In Herrin v. Sutherland, decided in 1925, the defendant was 
sued for trespass on the land of the plaintiff in eight separate causes 
of action.31  In six of the causes of action, the defendant clearly 
trespassed on the plaintiff’s land.  The charges included: tramping 
on hay and grain crops; breaking through a fence to hunt birds; 
crossing the plaintiff’s private land to access public land and to get 
to a pond fully enclosed within plaintiff’s land; and shooting a 
                                                 
27.  Id. at 519-20. 
28.  Civ. Code § 1291 (1895) (codified as Mont. Code Ann. § 70-16-
201). 
29.  Civ. Code § 1091 (1895) (codified as Mont. Code Ann. § 70-1-
202). 
30.  Political Code § 2570 (1895) (codified as Mont. Code Ann. § 
85-1-111). 
31.  Herrin v. Sutherland, 241 P. 328 (Mont. 1925). 
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shotgun while on the plaintiff’s land.32  
 Two of the causes of action merit closer scrutiny, one may 
have addressed walking on the strip of land between the low-water 
and high-water marks of a navigable river and the other may have 
been a trespass for wading up a non-navigable stream.  Of note, 
defendant was also found to be trespassing because, after rowing 
his boat up the channel of the Missouri River in Lewis and Clark 
County and fishing, the plaintiff walked above the ordinary low-
water mark and above the high-water mark and “tramped upon and 
destroyed native and planted grasses.”  The Court concluded the 
defendant was a trespasser in going upon plaintiff’s land “in the 
fashion described.”33  It would be a stretch to consider Herrin as 
holding that it was a trespass for a person rowing a boat on a 
navigable for title river to walk along the strip between the low-
water and high-water marks, especially considering that the ruling 
in Kelly v. Gibson was not even addressed.  It seems safe to assume 
then that the Court must have meant that the trespass occurred 
when the defendant went above the high-water mark.   
The problematic cause of action surrounded the acts of the 
defendant wading up and down Fall Creek, a non-navigable stream, 
while fishing.  The court said: “It would seem clear that a man has 
no right to fish where he has no right to be.”34  However, the 
Court’s holding in this regard is confusing because the defendant 
again went upon the land of the plaintiff when he “tramped upon 
and destroyed the hay.”35  In this light, the Court’s opinion remains 
unclear.  Did the Court hold the defendant was simply a trespasser, 
or did the Court hold that a person trespasses by wading and fishing 
in a non-navigable stream?   
Importantly, the interpretation of this language is relevant 
to understanding the Court’s more modern jurisprudence on the 
issue.  If the latter was the actual intended holding, Curran in 1984 
overruled the holding.36  Justice Holloway, in a concurring opinion, 
                                                 
32.  Id. at 332-33. 
33.  Id. at 331. 
34.  Id. 
35.  Id. 
36.  Curran, 682 P.2d at 171 (“[T]he holding [in Herrin] is purely 
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would have disposed of the case summarily because in each cause 
of action there was a technical trespass.37 
 Since 1933, a Montana statute has recognized a public right 
to use the water and banks up to the “high water flow line” of 
“navigable” rivers, streams, and sloughs for fishing.38  If the term 
“navigable” means navigable for title rivers, sloughs and streams, 
then the statute makes it clear that the angling public has an 
easement to use the strip between the ordinary low-water and high-
water marks, a strip of land that by statute is owned by the riparian 
landowner.39  Alternatively, if the statute was intended to apply to 
more than just navigable for title rivers and streams, the language 
could arguably encompass more than just the strip of land on 
navigable for title rivers because the language addresses “any rights 
of title” between the high-water lines which could then include non-
navigable for title streams.40 
 Such an interpretation is less far-fetched when the statutory 
definition of public ways is considered.  The statutory language 
added to navigable waters, “all streams of sufficient capacity,” not 
just for the purpose of navigation, but also for the transportation of 
“the products of the country.”41  Potentially, this language could 
                                                                                                             
dicta, has no precedential value[,] . . .  and . . . is contrary to the public trust 
doctrine and the 1972 Montana Constitution.” Id.) (emphasis added).  
37.  Herrin, 241 P. 333. 
38.  Mont. Code Ann. § 87-2-305 (1933) provides: “Navigable 
rivers, sloughs, or streams between the lines of ordinary high water . . . shall 
hereafter be public waters for the purpose of angling, and any rights of title to 
such streams or the land between the high water flow lines or within the 
meander lines of navigable streams shall be subject to the right of any person . 
. . who desires to angle therein or along their banks to go upon the same for 
such purpose.” Additionally, rivers and streams are navigable if they have 
“been meandered and returned as navigable” by United States surveyors, or if 
they are navigable in fact. 1933 Mont. Laws ch. 95, §§ 1, 2 (codified as Mont. 
Code Ann. § 85-1-112). 
39.  Mont. Code Ann. § 70-16-201 (1895). 
40.  Mont. Code Ann. § 87-2-305; see Herrin, 241 P. 333. 
41.  Mont. Code Ann. § 85-1-111 (1901) This statute provides in 
pertinent part that “[n]avigable waters and all streams of sufficient capacity to 
transport the products of the country are public ways for the purposes of 
navigation and such transportation.” Id. (emphasis added). 
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support more than just the use of navigable for title rivers for 
transportation, but all waters that meet the test of sufficient 
capacity. While this may be regarded as a stretch, the district court 
in Curran employed a similar parsing of the language to define a 
recreational floating or pleasure boat test for navigable for 
recreation streams that included using the bed and banks.42  
 The discussion of stream access in Montana prior to the 
Curran and Hildreth litigation and the 1985 Legislature’s adoption 
of the Stream Access Law would not be complete without 
considering how the 1972 Constitutional Convention addressed 
stream access and the Public Trust Doctrine. 
 The delegates of the Constitutional Convention discussed 
the Public Trust Doctrine with the resulting adoption of two 
proposed constitutional provisions addressing a clean and healthful 
environment.  Both are now part of the 1972 Constitution ratified 
by the people of Montana, one as an enumerated inalienable 
right,43 and the other establishing a duty of the state and each 
person to maintain and improve.44  Most significant for stream 
access was language added in the revised section on water rights.  
There, the relevant language states that waters in the state “are the 
property of the state for the use of its people.”45 
 In a discussion of the above phrase, Delegate Aronow 
expressed his opinion on the state of stream access at the time: 
 
you can go up and down that stream all you want to.  
But the only thing is, you can’t drive across the 
rancher’s lands willy-nilly in order to get to it.  You 
                                                 
42.  Mont. Coal. for Stream Access v. Curran, No. 45148, (1st 
Judicial Dist. Ct. Mont. Dec. 7, 1982) (mem. re mots. for sum. j.); See infra at 
11-14, discussion of the Dearborn River case in Curran, No. 45148. 
43.  Mont. Const. art. II, § 3 (inalienable rights); Constitutional 
Convention Tr. 2933, 2934 (adoption). 
44.  Mont. Const. art. IX, § 1(1). “The state and each person shall 
maintain and improve a clean and healthful in Montana for present and future 
generations.” Constitutional Convention Tr. 2938, 2939 (adoption). 
45.  Mont. Const. art. IX, § 3(3) (emphasis added); Constitutional 
Convention Vol. II, 552-553 (Nat’l Res. & Agric. Majority Proposal), Trans. 
2938, 2939 (adoption). 
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can go along the county roads or wherever there’s 
access.  And you certainly may boat.  You may hike 
up and down that stream.46 
 
 There was a delegate proposal that foreshadowed stream 
access to a remarkable degree, but was not further discussed.47  
While the Constitutional Convention did not adopt any more 
specific provision,48 one way or the other, on stream access, there 
was the above prescient acknowledgement of stream access. 
B. The Dearborn River Case (Curran) in District Court 
 The Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. 
(“Coalition”), filed a lawsuit in the First Judicial District of the 
State of Montana on April 14, 1980, asserting that the public had 
the right to float, fish, and recreate between the high-water marks 
of the Dearborn River, as it flows through the property of 
landowner Dennis Michael Curran.49  As the litigation proceeded, 
the Montana Department of State Lands (now reorganized within 
the Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation) 
                                                 
46.  Constitutional Convention Tr. 1305. 
47.  Constitutional Convention Vol. I, 76. Delegate Proposal No. 2 
proposed a new constitutional section that would provide: “Section ---. Water.  
All of the water in this state, whether occurring on the surface or 
underground, and whether occurring naturally or artificially, belongs to the 
people of Montana; and those waters which are capable of substantial or 
significant public use may be used by the people with or without diversion or 
development works, regardless of whether the waters occur on public or 
private lands.  The public has the right to the recreational use of such waters 
and their beds and banks to the high water mark regardless of whether the 
waters are navigable and regardless of whether the beds and banks are 
privately owned.  Beneficial use of waters includes recreation and aesthetics, 
such as habitat for fish and wildlife and scenic waterways.” Id.  The remainder 
of the proposal was language on water use similar to other proposals including 
language that passed. 
48.  A new proposed Constitution of Montana was adopted by the 
Constitutional Convention March 22, 1972 and was ratified by the people June 
6, 1972 (Referendum No. 68). 
49.  Curran, No. 45148 (mem. re mots. for summ. j.). 
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intervened as a plaintiff, claiming the state had title to the bed of 
the Dearborn River.  Subsequently, DFWP and the State of 
Montana were joined as involuntary plaintiffs. 
DFWP described the Dearborn River as follows: 
 
The Dearborn River originates along the east slope 
of the Continental Divide in west-central Montana.  
The river flows generally in a southeasterly direction 
from its source near Scapegoat Mountain, 
approximately 30 miles southwest of Augusta, 
Montana, to the Missouri River, a distance of 
approximately 66 miles.  The first 20 miles of the 
Dearborn’s course is through mountainous and 
canyon terrain, roughly 12 miles of which lie in the 
Scapegoat Wilderness.  After this traverse, the river 
merges onto rolling plain and continues its flow for 
about 29 miles where it again enters a moderately 
timbered area.  The Dearborn flows for another 17 
miles and enters the Missouri River near Craig, 
Montana.50 
 
 Landowner Curran owned or controlled land through which 
approximately seven miles of the Dearborn flows, both upstream 
and downstream from where U.S. Highway 287 crosses the 
Dearborn.51  Historically, Curran had denied members of the public 
from floating, fishing, and recreating on the Dearborn River where 
it crossed his land, claiming ownership of the streambed.52  
Members of the public had for some time been floating, fishing, and 
observing the scenic beauty of the Dearborn River, with 
recreational floating available at least four months of the year.53 
 Based on “statute of necessity,” the district court developed 
a “practical rule” that a “Montana stream is navigable and 
                                                 
50.  Mem. in Support of Mot. for Summ. J. for Dept. of Fish, 
Wildlife and Parks (DFWP) at 1-2, Curran, No. 45148 (Apr. 23, 1982). 
51.  Curran, 682 P.2d at 165. 
52.  Mem. in Support of Mot. for Summ. J., supra note 50, at 2. 
53.  Id. at 12-13. 
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accessible over so much of its entire course as is navigable by 
recreational craft at any given time.”54  Under this rule of 
recreational navigation, aquatic recreationists could utilize a 
qualifying stream “between ordinary high water levels,” including 
wading in the stream and walking on dry land below the ordinary 
high-water line.55  This rule was based on state law, as contrasted 
with the federal rule determining navigable rivers for state title, i.e. 
ownership of the underlying bed. 
 The district court based its holding on an interpretation of 
three state statutes.  Because Montana Code Annotated § 87-2-305 
allows anglers to go along the banks of any “[n]avigable rivers, 
sloughs, or streams between the ordinary high water” to fish, and 
because Montana Code Annotated § 85-1-112 defines as navigable 
as “all rivers and streams which are navigable in fact,” the district 
court concluded that the legislature intended that streams capable 
of transporting anglers in some type of watercraft are “navigable” 
under Montana Code Annotated § 87-2-305, and therefore should 
be accessible to licensed anglers.56 
 Furthermore, the district court found that the legislature 
had broadened recreational navigability to all recreationists with 
the codified definition of public waterways in Montana Code 
Annotated § 85-1-111.57 The district court found by using these two 
separate terms “navigation” and “transportation” the legislature 
intended to include “ordinary, non-commercial travel” in the 
concept of navigation.  Navigation then, by state statute, includes 
travel for fishing, hunting, and recreation.58 The district court also 
found that the Dearborn River is navigable for title purposes with 
the bed of the river between the low-water marks owned by the 
state.  This was based on evidence of log floating at the time 
                                                 
54.  Curran, No. 45148 at 4 (mem. re mots. for summ. j.). 
55.  Id. 
56.  Id. at 2-3. 
57.  “Navigable water and all streams of sufficient capacity to carry 
the products of the country are public ways for the purpose of navigation and 
such transportation.” Id. at 3 (quoting Mont. Code. Ann. § 85-1-111).  
58.  Id. at 3-4. 
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statehood was granted.59 
 The district court then dismissed the motion of DFWP that 
Article IX, § 3(3) of the 1972 Montana Constitution means the 
waters of the Dearborn are “public waters” held in trust for public 
uses.60  DFWP’s argument was based on the language of subsection 
(3), which provides that “[a]ll surface . . . waters . . . are the 
property of the state for the use of its people.”  The district court 
reasoned that: Article IX was not self-executing; the legislature had 
not implemented any right of the public for recreational access to 
state waters; and the probable purpose of Article IX, as a whole, 
“was to preserve the historical appropriation system of water rights 
. . .  rather than to assume public access to water for purposes other 
than appropriation.”61  The district court cited the Colorado 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Emmert62 for this principle, but also 
decided that the common law rule “he who owns the land controls 
that above it” had been set aside by the legislature though its 
statutes on navigable streams.63 
 The district court granted plaintiff’s motion to dismiss 
defendant’s counterclaim for inverse condemnation.64  The key 
points of the district court’s decision in Curran are that members of 
the public have the right to float and recreate in non-navigable 
streams, that they may wade and use the banks up to the ordinary 
high-water, and that these rights are founded in statutory language.  
Later, on appeal, the Montana Supreme Court held the public has 
broader rights that are permanently established by the Public Trust 
Doctrine embedded in the Montana Constitution. 
 
 
 
                                                 
59.  Id. at 7-16. 
60.  Id. at 16-18; Mem. in Support of Mot. for Summ. J., supra note 
50, at 13-15. 
61.  Curran, No. 45148 at 17 (mem. re mots. for sum. j.).  
62.  People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025 (Colo. 1979). 
63.  Curran, No. 45148 at 17 (mem. re mots. for sum. j.). 
64.  Id. at 18. 
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C. The Beaverhead River Case (Hildreth) in District Court  
 The Coalition, on April 8, 1981, filed a complaint in the 
state district court for Beaverhead County asserting that members 
of the public had the right to float and recreate on the Beaverhead 
River.65  The suit was against landowner Lowell S. Hildreth for a 
variety of actions.  Most notably, Hildreth had installed a fence 
across the downstream side of a bridge on his property, was 
preparing to install a cable across the river further upstream, and 
was harassing and interfering with floaters.66 
 The Beaverhead River is formed by the confluence of 
Horse Prairie Creek and the Red Rock River, now inundated by 
the Clark Canyon Dam.  The Beaverhead River flows in a 
northeastern direction for fifty miles from the dam to join the Big 
Hole River where they form the Jefferson River near Twin 
Bridges.67  The river flows through Hildreth’s land for 1.5 miles, 
starting approximately two miles below the dam.68  The Beaverhead 
River was, and had been for decades, floated by persons fishing and 
recreating without permission.69 Initially, the landowner was 
enjoined from interfering with floaters and required to remove the 
fence on the downside of Hildreth bridge across the river.70  
Hildreth’s counterclaim for a taking by inverse condemnation was 
dismissed in part, because the court found no viable takings claim 
under either of the potential outcomes, i.e., if the members of the 
public had a right to float or did not have a right to float, the issue 
of a takings was resolved either way.71 
The district court held: 
 
                                                 
65.  Mont. Coal. for Stream Access v. Hildreth, No. 9604 (5th 
Judicial Dist. Ct. Mont. Dec. 7, 1982) (findings of facts and conclusions of 
law). 
66.  Id. at 10. 
67.  Id. at 2. 
68.  Id. at 2-3. 
69.  Id. at 12. 
70.  Id. (May 15, 1981) (prelim. inj.). 
71.  Id. (June 23, 1982) (order). 
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The Beaverhead River, where it runs through the 
property of Defendant, is navigable under the 
pleasure-boat test of navigability, and, as such, 
members of the public have the right to float the 
river and use its banks up to the ordinary high water 
mark free from interference from Defendant.72 
 
The court also held that the public could portage around the bridge 
during times of high-water “when necessary, in a manner which is 
least intrusive to the interference with Defendant’s property.”73 The 
court had initially severed and reserved the issue of Hildreth’s 
counterclaim for an inverse condemnation.  Then, the court, in 
certifying its final judgment, pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Montana 
Rules of Civil Procedure, rejected the counterclaim with the 
following language: “[t]his court views the issues decided in favor of 
plaintiff to be dispositive of the remaining issues, and if affirmed on 
appeal, the remaining issues would probably be thereby resolved.”74  
 In review, both district courts adopted a pleasure boat test 
of navigability for recreational use, not just to float a river, but to 
also use the bed and banks up to the ordinary high-water mark.  
Interestingly, one court based its holding on an interpretation of 
state statutes on navigability, but rejected the Public Trust Doctrine 
in its decision.  The other based its decision on the persuasive force 
of holdings in other jurisdictions, without mentioning the public 
trust at all.  As it turns out, the Montana Supreme Court would see 
things differently.  
D. The Montana Supreme Court Decisions in Curran and Hildreth 
 Twice in the summer of 1984, the Montana Supreme Court 
was faced with deciding what rights the public had to utilize streams 
and rivers in Montana for recreation: first, in Curran and one 
month later in Hildreth. 
                                                 
72.  Id. at 14 (findings of fact and conclusions of law). 
73.  Id. at 16. 
74.  Id. at 2 (Dec. 22, 1982) (j.). 
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In Montana Coalition for Steam Access v. Curran,75 decided 
May 15, 1984 and written by Chief Justice Haswell, the Court issued 
a uniquely broad and encompassing determination of the public 
right to stream access.  Initially, the Court affirmed the district 
court’s decision that the Dearborn River was navigable under the 
federal law of navigability for title by application of a log-floating 
test and, therefore, title to the riverbed was held by the state in 
accordance with the Equal Footing Doctrine.76  The Court then 
addressed whether, under state law, recreational use and fishing 
make a stream navigable.  The Court, in clear and exceptionally 
broad language held: 
 
In sum, we hold that, under the public trust doctrine 
and the 1972 Montana Constitution, any surface 
waters that are capable of recreational use may be 
so used by the public without regard to streambed 
ownership or navigability for nonrecreational 
purposes.77 
 
The Court cited to specific language in Article IX, § 3(3) of the 
1972 Montana Constitution: 
 
All surface, underground, flood, and atmospheric 
waters within the boundaries of the state are 
property of the state for the use of its people and are 
subject to appropriation for beneficial uses as 
provided in law.78 
 
It seems ironic that the Court cited the Wyoming Supreme Court in 
support for the proposition that the public can use water suitable 
for recreation “without regard to title or navigability,”79 as 
                                                 
75.  Curran, 682 P.2d 163. 
76.  Id. at 168. 
77.  Id. at 171. 
78.  Id. at 170. 
79.  Id. at 170 (citing Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d. 137, 147 (Wyo. 
1961)). 
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Wyoming’s prohibition on touching the bed and banks of non-
navigable for title streams, stands almost in polar opposition to 
Montana’s law on stream access.80  In fact, the Court erroneously 
summarized Wyoming law as holding “that public recreational use 
of the waters was limited only by the susceptibility of the water for 
that purpose.”81   
Of great importance, the Montana Court cited to and 
quoted from the seminal 1892 United States Supreme Court 
decision as clearly defining the Public Trust Doctrine.82  The Court 
first found that under the Public Trust Doctrine “states hold title to 
navigable waterways in trust for public benefit”83 and then declared 
that under the Constitution of Montana, all waters of the state “are 
owned by the state and are held in trust for the people.”84    
 However, the Court cautioned the opinion did not grant 
the public any right to “enter upon or cross over private property to 
reach state owned waters hereby held available for recreational 
purposes.”85  Rather, the Court held, “that the public has the right 
to use the state-owned water to the point of the high water mark” 
except for barriers which the public could portage around “in the 
least intrusive way” while “avoiding damage to private property.”86  
In support of its finding that the public right to use streams extends 
to the high-water mark, the Court relied on the “angling statute,”87 
and Gibson v. Kelly, an 1895 decision that “recognized a public 
right to access for fishing and navigational purposes.”88 
 Just over a month later, the Court issued its opinion in 
Montana Coalition for Stream Access v. Hildreth.  Again authored 
                                                 
80.  Day, 362 P.2d at 145-46 (limiting stream access in Wyoming to 
floating only, with no wading or walking on the bed and banks). 
81.  Curran, at 170. 
82.  Id. at 167-68 (citing Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 
(1892)). 
83.  Id. at 168.  
84.  Id. at 170. 
85.  Id. at 172. 
86.  Id. at 172. 
87.  Mont. Code Ann. § 87-2-305. 
88.  Curran, at 172; for the angling statute, see supra note 38; for a 
discussion of Gibson v. Kelly, see supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
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by Chief Justice Haswell, the Court’s opinion reinforced the 
public’s right to recreate in Montana streams by deciding public 
recreational use rights on a stream that was not navigable for title.89  
The district court had “found the Beaverhead River navigable for 
recreation under the pleasure-boat test.” The Court affirmed the 
result but said it was “unnecessary and improper to determine a 
specific test under which to find navigability for recreational use.”90   
The Court reinforced Curran, saying:   
 
the capability of the use of the waters for 
recreational purposes determines whether the 
waters can be so used.  The Montana Constitution 
clearly provides that the state owns the waters for 
the benefit of its people.  The Constitution does not 
limit the waters’ use.  Consequently, this Court 
cannot limit their use by inventing some restrictive 
test.91 
 
The Court addressed specifically the corresponding public right to 
use the bed and banks: 
 
Under the 1972 Constitution, the only possible 
limitation of use can be the characteristics of the 
waters themselves.  Therefore no owner of property 
adjacent to state-owned waters has the right to 
control the use of those waters as they flow through 
his property.  The public has the right to use the 
waters and the bed and banks up to the ordinary 
high water mark.92 
 
 In summary, the Court held, and confirmed in agreement 
with Curran, that for rivers that are navigable for recreational 
purposes public use is limited “only by the capabilities of the water 
                                                 
89.  Hildreth, 684 P.2d 1088. 
90.  Id. at 1091. 
91.  Id. 
92.  Id. 
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for such use”93 and “the public has the right to use the bed and 
banks up to the ordinary high water mark.”94  Therefore, Curran 
and Hildreth recognize a public right to recreate in waters by 
floating, wading, and walking along the bank up to the high-water 
mark. 
 In dismissing Hildreth’s claim for inverse condemnation, the 
Court explained that “[p]ublic use of the waters and bed and banks 
of the Beaverhead up to the ordinary high water mark was 
determined, not title.”95  Further, because “Hildreth has never 
owned and does not now own the waters of the Beaverhead 
River”96 he was not “deprived of a property right by the district 
court.”97 
 Justice Gulbrandson dissented and would have left the 
conflicts between landowners and recreational users up to the 
Montana legislature.  He claimed, based on recent sessions, “there 
has been public evidence that a reasonable and legal solution could 
have been achieved within the legislative forum.”98  As we shall see, 
infra, the legislature was contemplating stream access significantly 
more restrictive than stream access required by the Curran and 
Hildreth decisions. 
II. THE STREAM ACCESS DEBATE IN THE MONTANA 
LEGISLATURE PRIOR TO AND FOLLOWING CURRAN 
AND HILDRETH  
As the story now transitions to the public policy arena, it is 
important to appreciate the position in which the Montana 
Legislature found itself following the landmark decisions just 
announced.  To be sure, the Montana Supreme Court had left no 
doubt as to the perimeter of a very broad and encompassing public 
recreation right anchored in the Montana Constitution and the 
                                                 
93.  Id. at 1094. 
94.  Id. 
95.  Id. at 1093. 
96.  Id. at 1094. 
97.  Id. 
98.  Id. at 1095. 
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Public Trust Doctrine.  Yet, the suspense of the time surrounded 
the looming question of whether the legislature would honor the 
constitutional and public trust mandates of the Montana Supreme 
Court.   
Across the state, the politics and social ideals of public 
access were dividing Montanans. The legislature, in the 1983 
Session and for most of the interim before the 1985 Session, was 
setting a course towards a comparatively quite restrictive version of 
public access.  Even after the May and June 1984 Supreme Court 
decisions, a dramatic struggle ensued between very restrictive 
stream access proposals and the very broad framework established 
by the Supreme Court.  
A. The 1983 Legislature Failed to Adopt Any Stream Access 
Statutes 
 The Montana Legislature was indeed addressing stream 
access concurrent with the process of the litigation in the district 
courts and the Supreme Court.  In the 1983 legislative session, there 
were four significant bills introduced dealing with the subject of 
stream access.  The one that passed was House Joint Resolution 
36.99  HJR 36 requested that an interim committee be assigned to 
study the rights of the public to access and use public lands and 
waterways and to identify and preserve the rights of landowners 
adjacent to public land and waterways.  The resolution identified a 
list of study topics: methods of acquiring access across private land; 
right of the public to use waterways, including a legislative 
definition of navigability, if necessary, and use of adjacent uplands; 
rights and title interests of adjacent landowners; landowner’s right 
to place fences, bridges, flumes, etc. in the waterway; and liabilities 
of landowners and public users. 
 Perhaps the strangest proposed bill of the 1983 Legislative 
session was SB 348.100  The bill was a reaction to the district court 
decision in the Curran litigation.  The district court had read the 
                                                 
99.  H.R.J. Res. 36, 48th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Mont. Mar. 19, 1983). 
100.  S. 348, 48th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Mont. Feb. 3, 1983) 
(Introduced Bill). 
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statutory definition of navigable in Montana Code Annotated § 85-
1-112 as broader than the requirements set out by the U.S. Supreme 
Court for determination of rivers navigable for title.  This 
determination, coupled with Montana Code Annotated § 87-2-305 
that allows anglers to wade on the bed and banks of state defined 
“navigable streams,” was the grounding of the district court’s 
conclusion that Montana had a pleasure boat test for public access 
of streams along with the use of the bed and banks.101   
SB 348 narrowed the state statutory definition of “navigable 
for recreation” to one more restrictive than the federal test of 
“navigable for title.”102  In order to qualify, a stream must have 
been “actually used in its ordinary condition as a highway for 
commerce, travel and trade . . . and if the commerce, trade, and 
travel were successful activities.”  The federal Daniel Ball test 
includes rivers that are susceptible of being used as highways of 
commerce and do not necessarily require that the commerce be 
successful.  Furthermore, under the requirements of SB 348 for 
recreational use, the stream must have been used in this manner on 
the date of statehood, November 8, 1889.  
The effect of SB 348 would have been dramatic.  Under the 
proposed law, the floating of logs and recreational use would not 
qualify any stream for the status of navigable for recreation under 
the new state law.103  For example, the Dearborn River would still 
be a navigable river for title with the state owning the bed of the 
river; however, under the new statutory definition the public would 
have no right to float or fish the Dearborn River where it flowed 
through private land.  The DFWP testified that the bill “would 
effectively ‘lock out’ historic uses of most of Montana’s rivers . . . In 
fact, all portions of the original Blue Ribbon streams104 would be 
                                                 
101.  Curran, No. 45148, at 2-4 (mem. re mots. for sum. j.). 
102.  See The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. at 563; see also supra note 15 
and accompanying text. 
103.  S. 348, supra note 100, at 1-2.  
104.  1969 Mont. Laws ch. 345, 875 (H.R. 450) amended Rev. 
Code  Mont. 1947 § 89-801 by adding § 2, which authorized the Commission to 
appropriate instream flows in 12 “blue ribbon” streams and rivers “to 
maintain stream flows necessary for the preservation of fish and wildlife 
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excluded from the list of navigable streams.”105   
 Although SB 348 died in the Senate Judiciary Committee,106 
several other bills were proposed with similarly egregious 
ambitions.  HB 799 would have transferred the title of the bed of 
navigable for title rivers to any private riparian landowners107 in 
clear violation of the Enabling Act, the Montana Constitution, and 
the Public Trust Doctrine.108  HB 888, as introduced, would have 
transferred title to the bed of navigable for title rivers to the 
riparian landowners.109  This part of the bill was amended on the 
House Floor to exclude rivers “determined at anytime to be 
navigable under the federal navigability definition.”110  The effect 
of the amendment was to return the ownership of the beds of 
navigable rivers to the state, albeit in an awkwardly worded 
amendment to Montana Code Annotated § 70-16-201.111  The other 
major amendment in the bill was to create a Wyoming type stream 
access112 limited to floating rivers only with “a canoe, kayak, 
                                                                                                             
habitat.” Id. The 1973 Montana Water Use Act repealed § 89-801 of 1973 
Mont Laws ch. 452, § 46, 1121. However, the repeal did not affect the 
completed instream flow appropriations. 
105.  S. JUDICIARY COMM., DEBATE ON S. 348, 48th Legis., Reg. 
Sess. (Mont. Feb. 16, 1983) (written testimony of Jim Flynn, Director, DFWP). 
106.  History and Final Status, S. 348, 48th Legis., Reg. Sess., Sen. 
Bills and Res., 118 (Mont. 1983). 
107.  H.R. 799, 48th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Mont. Feb. 15, 1983) 
(Introduced Bill). 
108.  The Enabling Act of 1889, 25 Stat. 676 (Feb. 22, 1889); Mont. 
Const. of 1889, art. XVII, § 1. Both require full market value for the disposal 
of state land. The Public Trust Doctrine as adopted by the Montana Supreme 
Court in Curran, 682 P.2d at 167-8 (citing Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. 387).  The 
Doctrine prohibits, except in limited circumstances, Montana from conveying 
navigable river beds into private ownership. 
109.  H.R. 888, 48th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Mont. Feb. 17, 1983) 
(Introduced Bill). 
110.  H.R. 888, 48th Legis., Reg. Sess. § 2 (Mont. Feb. 22, 1983) 
(3d Reading). The amendment was confusing because the language as 
amended no longer said whether the riparian landowner takes to the low or 
high-water mark. 
111.  Id.  
112.  Day, 362 P.2d at 145-46 (limits stream access in Wyoming to 
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inflatable boat, skiff, or any other boat designed to be propelled by 
oar, paddle, or motor.”113   
Both HB 888 as introduced and as amended, would allow 
members of the public “to navigate and exercise the instance of 
navigation” in rivers using the defined watercraft.114  This in itself 
presumably would not allow floaters to wade or touch the bed and 
banks, except to portage around obstructions.  Since Montana Code 
Annotated § 87-2-305 was not amended, which allows anglers to use 
the bed and banks of navigable rivers, sloughs, or streams, the issue 
of the use of the beds and banks would be somewhat uncertain if 
HB 888 had passed. 115 
 All of these three major bills (SB 348, HB 799, and HB 888) 
proposed to adopt stream access provisions that would be radically 
more restrictive than the preceding district court decisions in the 
Curran and Hildreth litigation. The study resolution, HJR 36, 
however would provide an informative window on the political 
debate, both before and after the Supreme Court decisions in 
Curran and Hildreth, in the summer of 1985.116 
B. The 1985 Legislature Enacts the Stream Access Law 
 After the 1983 session, the odyssey of the adoption of the 
present stream access statutes began.  To follow in a meaningful 
way the course of the legislative struggle and eventual success, it is 
critical to keep in mind the two main threads of stream access in 
                                                                                                             
floating only with no wading or walking on the bed and banks). 
113.  H.R. 888, supra note 109, at 2-3. 
114.  Id. at § 3 (Mont. Feb. 17, 1983) (Introduced Copy) (adding § 
(3)(a) to Mont. Code Ann. § 85-1-112); H.R. 888, 48th Legis., Reg. Sess., 
Section 3 (Mont. Feb. 22, 1983) (3d Reading) (amending new § (3)(a) of Mont. 
Code Ann. § 85-1-112) (this amendment would have limited stream access to 
navigable for title rivers). 
115.  History and Final Status, H.R. 888, 48th Legis., Reg. Sess., 
H. Bills and Res. 316 (Mont. 1983). House Bill 888 passed in the House, but 
died in the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Livestock, and Irrigation; 
History and Final Status, H.R. 799, 48th Legis., Reg. Sess., H. Bills and Res. 
287 (Mont. 1983). H.R. 799 in the House Committee on Fish and Game.  
116.  Curran, 682 P.2d 163; Hildreth, 684 P.2d 1088. 
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Montana.  The primary stream access guarantees of the Supreme 
Court’s Curran and Hildreth decisions are that the capability of a 
stream for recreation defines the extent of the public right, and that 
the public has the right to use the bed and banks of a stream up to 
the ordinary high-water mark while recreating in a stream.  
Translated to its practical application, several principles followed: 
all streams are open to stream access; there can be no floating or 
pleasure boat test; and recreationists may wade in the stream and 
walk on the bank up to the ordinary high-water line.   
Nevertheless, one significant question remained unresolved 
by the Court: how to define the details of the extent and limits of 
stream access?  Addressing these details in statute would provide 
specific guidance for recreationists and protect the private property 
rights of riparian landowners.  This category of definitions includes: 
defining the ordinary high-water mark, recreational use, and 
barriers; determining what activities do not qualify and are not 
allowed as water-related pleasure activities; how to regulate 
portage activities; how to treat water diverted into irrigation and 
drainage ditches and water conveyed as part of a municipal water 
supply system; what activities are not appropriate in the smaller 
streams; limits on landowners liability; assuring that the recreating 
public has no right to cross private property to get to a stream or 
river; and that access across private property by the public cannot 
be the basis of a prescriptive easement.   
While the above principles will determine the merits of 
proposed legislation and help grade the debate and final legislative 
product, initially the legislature did not have the absolute resolve of 
the Supreme Court’s decisions.  Instead, the two district court 
decisions, based on statutory interpretations or the application of 
common law principles, allowed the legislature almost unlimited 
latitude prior to the Curran and Hildreth decisions. 
 In June 1983, the Legislative Council (a committee 
composed of legislators with the duty of overseeing and directing 
legislative staff and interim activities)117 assigned the study of water 
                                                 
117.  Mont. Code Ann. §§ 5-11-101 to 120 (1985) (established the 
Legislative Council and authorized its powers and duties). 
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recreation under HJR 36 to joint Interim Subcommittee No. 2.118 
The committee met in August 1983, January 1984, and March 1984 
to study the legal issues, develop a work plan, and hold a public 
hearing.119  The tangible result was a request by the committee for 
local groups and individuals, aided by conservation districts, to 
identify floatable and non-floatable streams in their areas.120 
 Then, the legal and policy landscape changed dramatically 
when the Curran decision was announced on May 15 and the 
Hildreth decision on June 21.121  At the next meeting on July 30, the 
committee was advised on the limits that the Supreme Court’s 
decisions placed on legislative response.  The committee was 
advised that because of the Court’s ruling based on the Public Trust 
Doctrine embedded in the language of Montana’s 1972 
Constitution and applied to all surface waters “the only possible 
limitation of the use arises from the characteristics of the water.”122  
Professor Margery Brown advised on the decision space of the 
Legislature in that it “may alter existing statutes not only to protect 
this newly enunciated public right but also to underscore the public 
responsibilities that go with these rights, insofar as protection of 
adjacent landowner property rights is concerned.”123  Similarly, 
another consultant advised that because the court based its decision 
on the Public Trust Doctrine “the Legislature cannot substantially 
modify the result of those decisions.   Had the court based its 
decision on narrower grounds (e.g., statutory grounds), the 
Legislature would have been able to modify the results of the 
decisions by changing statutes.”124 
 Along the same line, Senator Jack Galt asked if a 
                                                 
118.  J. INTERIM SUBCOMM. NO. 2, 49TH LEGIS., REPORT ON 
RECREATIONAL USE OF MONTANA’S WATERWAYS 2 (1985). 
119.  Id. at 5-6. 
120.  Id. at 6-7. 
121.  Curran, 682 P.2d 163; Hildreth, 684 P.2d 1088. 
122.  J. INTERIM SUBCOMM. NO. 2, 49TH LEGIS., HJR 36 WATER 
RECREATION STUDY, MINUTES, at 10 (July 30, 1984) (testimony of Margery 
Brown, Assoc. Dean, Univ. of Mont. Sch. of Law). 
123.  Id. at 11 (testimony of Dean Brown). 
124.  Id. at 9 (testimony of consultant John Thorson). 
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prohibition on the use of river beds would be legal and was advised, 
“[t]he right to use the bed is so fundamentally related to the 
public’s interest in the water that even the legislature cannot take it 
away.”125  In spite of clear, contrary advice, the subcommittee voted 
4-3 (Representative James D. Jenson absent) to draft a Wyoming-
type bill that would restrict stream access to floating and prohibit 
“the angler from walking up the stream.”126  At the following and 
last meeting of the subcommittee on September 28, a motion to 
strike this section of the subcommittee bill died on a tie vote.127 
 The result was a draft designated Legislative Council 
(“LC”) 69128 that carried out the subcommittee’s recommendation 
to the 1985 Montana Legislature to enact a bill “prohibiting, with 
certain exceptions, use of land beneath surface waters that do not 
satisfy the federal test of navigability for purposes of state 
ownership.”129  The bill would allow the use of the beds and banks 
of rivers that satisfy the “federal test of navigability for purposes of 
the state ownership.”130  In the end, LC 69 was introduced in the 
1985 session as HB 16.131 
 With the failure of the Joint Interim Subcommittee to 
recommend viable stream access legislation that did not blatantly 
violate the tenets of the Curran and Hildreth decisions, the fate of 
successful stream access legislation now rested in the hands of 
others.  A coalition of groups representing landowners and 
agricultural interests, led by Helena attorney Ron Waterman, went 
to the Director of DFWP, Jim Flynn, to propose that his coalition 
work with DFWP and recreationists on a “compromise bill.”  As a 
consequence, Mr. Waterman and DFWP attorney Stan Bradshaw 
were assigned the task of drafting a bill that would be faithful to the 
Curran and Hildreth decisions while addressing many of the 
                                                 
125.  Id. at 11-12. 
126.  Id. at 32-33. 
127.  J. INTERIM SUBCOMM. NO. 2., 49TH LEGIS., HJR 36 WATER 
RECREATION STUDY, MINUTES, at 40 (Sept. 28, 1984). 
128.  J. INTERIM SUBCOMMI  NO. 2, supra 118, at Appendix A. 
129.  Id. at i, ¶ (1)(b), Appendix A (LC 69, § 3(2)). 
130.  Id. at i, ¶ (1)(c), Appendix A (LC 69, § 3(1)). 
131.  H.R. 16, 49th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Mont. Jan. 7, 1985). 
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concerns of landowners.132  The result was HB 265, sponsored by 
Representative Bob Ream and supported by the coalition of 
agricultural landowners, the coalition of recreationists, and 
DFWP.133 
 HB 265 as introduced134 divided surface waters in two 
categories: Class I waters that meet or potentially meet the federal 
navigability test for state streambed ownership; and, Class II waters 
which are all other surface waters that are not Class I waters.  Class 
I and Class II waters could be used by the public “without regard to 
the ownership of the land underlying the waters,” for all defined 
recreational uses the waters are capable of, including the use of the 
beds and banks up to the ordinary high-water mark.  Some uses of 
Class II waters were restricted, such as overnight camping, big game 
and bird hunting, use of all-terrain vehicles, and placement of 
permanent duck blinds and boat moorages.  Recreational use of 
stock ponds and ditches was prohibited.   
As written, a member of the public could portage around 
barriers and the bill established a formal process for establishing 
portage routes.  The bill also addressed landowner liability, 
provided a prohibition on prescriptive easements through 
recreational use of surface water, affirmed that the public had no 
right to cross private property to access streams, and defined terms, 
such as “barrier,” “ordinary high-water mark,” and “recreational 
use.”  During the session, the organizational structure of the bill 
would change, additional terms defined, definitions fine-tuned, 
some uses of Class I waters prohibited, and lakes and natural 
barriers were excluded.  These changes were the subject of 
significant debate, but the heart of the introduced bill remained in 
the language of the final, adopted bill. 
 The competing bills were: HB 16 (the subcommittee bill) 
that, for all streams that did not meet the federal test of navigability 
for state ownership of the beds, prohibited the use of the beds and 
                                                 
132.  Interview with Stan Bradshaw, Former Agency Attorney at 
Montana Fish, Wildlife & Parks, Helena (Mar. 28, 2014). 
133.  See infra notes. 140, 141, 143 and accompanying text. 
134.  H.R. 265, 49th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Mont. Jan. 18, 1985) 
(Introduced Copy). 
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banks so that only floating was allowed;135 HB 275 that would 
restrict stream access to a pleasure boat test but allowed the use of 
the beds and banks thereby ignoring the Supreme Court decisions 
in Curran and Hildreth while codifying the district court 
decisions;136 and HB 498, that in the same fashion as HB 16, 
proposed a Wyoming floating use only with essentially no use of the 
beds and bank except on navigable for title rivers.137  HB 16, HB 
275, and HB 498 all died in the House Judiciary Committee where 
the bills were referred after they were introduced.138  HB 265 was 
heard in a joint meeting of the House Judiciary Committee, House 
Fish and Game Committee, and the House Agriculture Committee 
on January 27, 1985 along with HB 16 and HB 275.139  Ron 
Waterman, in written testimony, described the introduced HB 265 
as the cooperative effort among landowners, recreationalists, and 
the DFWP.  The membership of the agricultural and landowner 
coalition who supported HB 265 was varied and diverse.140  
                                                 
135.  H.R. 16, 49th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Jan. 7, 1985) (Introduced 
Bill). 
136.  H.R. 275, 49th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Jan. 19, 1985) (Introduced 
Bill). 
137.   H.R. 498, 49th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Jan. 29, 1985) (Introduced 
Bill). 
138.  History and Final Status, H.R. 16, 48th Legis., Reg. Sess., H. 
Bills and Res. 8 (Mont. 1983); History and Final Status, H.R. 275, 48th Legis., 
Reg. Sess., H. Bills and Res. 98 (Mont. 1983); History and Final Status, H.R. 
498, 48th Legis., Reg. Sess., H. Bills and Res. 178 (Mont. 1983). 
139.  H. JUDICIARY COMM., MEETING ON H.R. 16, H.R. 265, H.R. 
275, MINUTES, at 1 (Jan. 22, 1985). 
140.  The following groups all supported House Bill 265: The 
Montana Stockgrowers Association, Montana Wool Growers Association, 
Montana Association of State Grazing Districts, Montana Cowbells, Montana 
Farmers Union, Montana Cattlemen’s Association, Montana Cattle Feeders 
Association, Montana Farm Bureau Federation, Montana Water 
Development Association, Women involved in Farm Economics, and the 
Agricultural Preservation Association. Id. Ex. C at 1, 8 (written testimony of 
Ron Waterman). The testimony also identified six major goals of the 
agricultural and landowner coalition: “(1) Recognition of private property 
rights; (2) Restriction of landowner liability; (3) Identification of the right of 
portage around barriers; (4) Limitation upon prescriptive easement to avoid 
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 The Montana Council of Trout Unlimited, represented by 
Mary Wright, testified that the agricultural groups initiated 
discussions with the sportsmen’s groups and DFWP with a resulting 
agreement on all the major issues raised by the Supreme Court’s 
decision.141 The agreed principles were proposed to 
Representatives Ream and Marks and embodied in HB 265.142  The 
Montana DFWP, represented by Director Jim Flynn, also testified 
in support of HB 265, acknowledging HB 265 as “a product of 
cooperation between two significant Montana interest groups.”143 
 The House Judiciary Committee appointed a subcommittee 
on stream access bills, with Representative Kerry Keyser selected 
as chairman.  The subcommittee met six times144 and adopted 
proposed amendments to HB 265145 that were then adopted by the 
full House Judiciary Committee.146  The subcommittee 
amendments adopted by the full House Judiciary Committee 
included several important components.147   
                                                                                                             
the loss of land ownership through recreational use activity; (5) a definition of 
high water to demonstrate it was the equivalent to the ‘ordinary high water 
mark’ of the Natural Streambed Preservation Act; and (6) limitation upon the 
public’s use to follow and recreate upon diverted waters.” Mont. Code Ann. 
§§ 75-7-101 to 125 (The Natural Streambed and Land Preservation Act of 
1975). H. JUDICIARY COMM., supra note 139, at Ex. C at 4. 
141.  H. JUDICIARY COMM., supra note 139, Ex. D at 1 (written 
testimony of Mary Wright). 
142.  Id. Ex. D at 1-2. 
143.  Id. Ex. E at 3 (written testimony of Jim Flynn). 
144.  See generally H. JUDICIARY SUBCOMM. ON STREAM ACCESS 
BILLS, MINUTES Jan. 25, 26, and 29, Feb. 4, 5, and 6, 1985.  
145.  Id. at 6 (Feb. 6, 1985). 
146.  H. JUDICIARY COMM., EXEC. SESS. ON MONT. H.R. 265, 
MINUTES, at 9 (Feb. 12, 1985). 
147.  The amendments included a grant of rulemaking authority to 
the Commission to consider limits on recreational necessary to protect the 
resource and private property; defined what commercial activities would 
qualify a river as a Class I water; added a catch-all phrase “other water-related 
pleasure activities” to the definition of “recreational use;” added a definition 
of “surface water;” that includes the bed and banks; changed the structure of 
restrictions on use of Class I and Class II waters from within the definition of 
recreational use to a separate section in the bill; prohibited the use of all-
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 After passing in the House, the Senate Judiciary Committee 
made extensive amendments to HB 265.  The primary amendment 
added was: “The public has no right to make recreational use of 
Class II waters without permission of the landowners.”148  Thus, in a 
single sentence the Senate Judiciary Committee voted to eviscerate 
the very essence of stream access that the Montana Supreme Court 
had held was a public trust right recognized by the 1972 Montana 
Constitution.  However, the whole Senate adopted amendments to 
reverse the heart of the Judiciary Committee amendments.149  
 In spite of the legislative progress, two troublesome results 
of the combination of the dueling amendments remained.  The 
definition of “recreational use” was amended so that fishing, 
hunting, and swimming could not be done “within 100 yards of an 
occupied dwelling” and, “recreational use” was further restricted by 
removing the catch-all phrase “other water related pleasure 
activities.”150 
 Then Senator Galt proposed an amendment that was 
adopted by the Senate to remove from the definition of “surface 
water” the part that allowed recreationists to use the bed and bank 
of a stream, again turning stream access into a right only to float on 
                                                                                                             
terrain vehicles and other motor vehicles and big game hunting within the 
ordinary high-water marks of all surface waters; added rulemaking authority 
to the Commission for governing the recreational use of Class I and Class II 
waters; and a few other amendments. H.R. 265, 49th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 
Feb. 14, 1985) (2d Reading). 
148.  Id. (Mar. 27, 1985) (S. Judiciary Comm. amendments to 3d 
Reading, No. 25).  
149.  Id. (Mar. 30, 1985) (S. Comm. of the whole amendments to 
3d Reading moved by Sen. Yellowtail). The result of the two sets of Senate 
amendments was to: remove natural objects from the definition of “barrier;” 
qualify that nothing in House Bill 265 makes portage around natural barriers 
lawful or unlawful; state that the recreational use of lakes is not addressed; 
restrict camping, placement of permanent duck blinds, boat moorage, etc. 
within sight or 500 yards of an occupied dwelling, whichever is less, on Class I 
waters; and added authority to the Fish and Game Commission to adopt a 
procedure for restricting, on Class II waters, recreational use to the actual 
capacity of the water. Id. (April 1, 1985) (Reference Bill). 
150.  Id. at § 1(10) (Reference Bill). 
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all rivers, including navigable rivers.151  A conference committee 
was appointed to address the different Senate and House versions 
and recommended that these last three severe restrictions be 
removed.152  Both the Senate and House adopted the conference 
committee report and when the Governor signed the bill on April 
19, 1985, Montana had a stream access law.153   
HB 520, that prohibits the recreational use without 
permission of any water directed for a beneficial use in irrigation 
ditches, drainage canals and ditches, etc., was passed.154  The bill’s 
language, but not the meaning, differed slightly from its counterpart 
in HB 265 so the two were meshed in Montana Code Annotated § 
23-2-301(6) and § 23-2-302(2) and (2)(c) by the Code 
Commissioner.155 
 The 1985 Legislature was perhaps the one and only session 
that could have passed a collaborative bill fashioned by both 
organizations representing recreationists and organizations 
representing landowners, that stayed true to the public recreational 
rights guaranteed by the Montana Supreme Court, and that 
provided needed definitions and detail while protecting the private 
property rights of riparian landowners.  Ultimately, eleven stream 
access bills were introduced.  Three of those that did not pass would 
have significantly restricted stream access in direct contradiction of 
the Supreme Court decision and five more died because their 
content was mirrored in HB 265, or because they were more 
restrictive regarding trespass then the legislature was comfortable 
with adopting.  The two bills that passed in addition to HB 265 
supplemented the themes of the compromises underlying the new 
stream access law. 
 The passage of HB 265 must be measured against strong 
                                                 
151.  Id. (March 30, 1985) (S. Comm. of the whole amendments to 
3d Reading moved by Sen. Galt). 
152.  Id. (April 10, 1985) (Conf. Comm. Rep.). 
153.  1985 Mont. Laws ch. 556, 1127 (codified at Mont. Code Ann. 
§§ 23-2-301 to 322). 
154.  1985 Mont. Laws ch. 429, 805 (H.R. 520). 
155.  Mont. Code Ann. §§ 23-2-301, 302, Annotation Compiler’s 
Comments 7 (2012). 
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and repeated efforts prior to and throughout the session to restrict 
stream access to floating only.  This opposition would have limited 
recreational use to the larger river only when there is enough water 
to float and would have prohibited fishing while wading.  The 
political contest started with a restrictive, proposed bill adopted by 
the interim committee, survived competing bills in the House, 
encountered rough waters in Senate Judiciary Committee and 
Senate floor amendments, and was finally resolved by a House and 
Senate conference committee.  In stark contrast to the attempts to 
limit stream access, the new Stream Access Law, with remarkable 
simplicity, allows recreational use of all rivers and streams within 
the ordinary high-water mark, whether floating, wading, or walking 
along the banks, while protecting riparian, private landowners from 
trespass above the high-water mark.  Thus, in retrospect, the 1985 
session can be viewed as representing legislative closure in 
establishing Montana’s stream access, but the controversy was not 
over.  
III.  LITIGATION CLAIMING THE STREAM ACCESS LAWS 
OF HB 265 WAS A TAKING OF PRIVATE PROPERTY 
WITHOUT JUST COMPENSATION  
 Almost immediately after the 1985 session, another phase in 
the evolving saga of stream access was initiated through directly 
attacking the newly adopted stream access statutes.  The strategy 
was to claim that the new law went too far, therefore resulting in an 
unconstitutional taking of private property without just 
compensation.  Interestingly, the initial litigation was led by the 
principal opponent in the legislature, Senator Jack Galt.  This 
attack would continue in different forms and venues until just 
recently. 
A. The Galt Taking Case in the District Court 
 A number of plaintiffs, Jack Galt and others, filed a 
complaint in state district court156 on June 14, 1985157 claiming that 
                                                 
156.  Galt v. State, No. ADV-85-565 (1st Judicial Dist. Ct. Mont. 
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House Bill 265158 was unconstitutional as a taking of private 
property without just compensation.   The plaintiffs claimed there 
was a taking because the new law allowed the public to recreate 
using the lands “between the high and low-water mark when there 
is no water upon the land and to create portage routes upon the 
private lands of plaintiffs above the high-water mark and around 
artificial barriers.”159  The complaint asked that HB 265 be declared 
“illegal, unconstitutional and void” because it was a taking.160 
 In the litigation, the plaintiffs argued that the Montana 
Supreme Court authorized recreational use only of the “waters and 
the streambed under those waters.”161 The plaintiffs relied upon the 
language of Montana Code Annotated § 70-16-201 which granted 
ownership of land to the riparian landowner on a navigable stream 
down to the low-water mark.  This statute uses “navigable” 
meaning navigable for title under the federal test.162  The plaintiffs 
made no distinction between navigable for title streams and other 
streams where a riparian landowner owns the land to the middle of 
the stream.163  The Defendants, State of Montana and DFWP, 
responded that HB 265 carefully tracked the Curran and Hildreth 
holdings and that both decisions “… declared that there was no 
taking of a landowner’s title because his ownership interest was 
impressed with a recreational easement,”164 although neither 
decision used the word “easement.” 
 The district court denied the plaintiffs’ claim that HB 265 
was unconstitutional, based on the doctrine of stare decisis, because 
                                                                                                             
Feb. 13, 1986) (op. and order). 
157.  Id. at 1. 
158.  1985 Mont. Laws ch. 556, 1227 (codified at Mont. Code Ann. 
§§ 23-2-301 to 322 (1985)). 
159.  Compl. § VI, Galt, No. ADV-85-565. 
160.  Id. at ¶ 1. 
161.  Pls.’ Br. in Support of Summ. J. at 16, Galt, No. ADV-85-565 
(emphasis in the original). 
162.  Gibson, 39 P. 517. 
163.  Mont. Code Ann. § 70-16-101; Pls’ Br., supra note 161, at 21. 
164.  St.’s Mem. of P. & A. in Opp’n to Pls.’ Br. in Support of 
Summ. J. and in Support of Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 2, Galt, No. ADV-85-
565 (Dec. 2, 1985). 
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the issue had already been decided in the Curran and Hildreth 
cases where: “the district courts dismissed Curran’s and Hildreth’s 
inverse condemnation claims and the Montana Supreme Court 
affirmed both decisions.”165  The district court specifically referred 
to the Hildreth court’s holding that “[t]he public has the right to use 
the waters and the bed and bank up to the ordinary high water 
mark.  (See Curran.) Further, . . . in the case of barriers, the public 
is allowed to portable around such barriers.”166  The district court 
compared the Hildreth language to the essentially identical 
language in HB 265.167 
B. The Galt Taking Case in the Montana Supreme Court 
 When the case reached the Montana Supreme Court, the 
appellants, plaintiffs in the district court (Galt, et al.), asserted that 
HB 265 was an unconstitutional taking of property for public 
recreational use without just compensation in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution, and constituted a 
taking or damaging of property in violation of Article II, § 29 of the 
1972 Montana Constitution.168 
 More specifically, Galt claimed that the public had rights 
only in the use of the water and had no right to use the bed and 
banks that were privately owned.169  For non-navigable waters, this 
meant the public could not use the streambed and banks.  
Therefore, floating only should be allowed.  For the larger 
navigable for title rivers, or essentially Class I waters as defined in 
HB 265, the public could not use, i.e. stand on or wade in, the strip 
between the high-water and low-water lines,170 apparently whether 
there was water flowing there or not.  This meant that a person 
                                                 
165.  Galt, No. ADV-85-565 at 15 (op. and order). 
166.  Id. at 14-15 (quoting Hildreth, 684 P.2d at 1091) (emphasis in 
original). 
167.  Id. at 15. 
168.  Br. of Appellants at 1, 10, Galt v. State, No. 86-178 (Mont. 
1986) (Apr. 28, 1986). 
169.  Id. passim. 
170.  Id. passim. 
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fishing could float and only wade if he or she was deep enough in 
the water to be below the low-water line.  In addition, and 
somewhat in conflict with their overarching argument, Galt also 
argued that the enumerated, allowed uses of the high- to low-water 
strip on Class I waters were unconstitutional.   
Montana Code Annotated § 23-2-301(2) prohibits some 
uses on all waters and allows some identified, but qualified uses on 
only Class I waters, the specific uses that Galt claimed were an 
unconstitutional use of private property: big game hunting with a 
long bow or shotgun if authorized by the Commission; overnight 
camping if out-of-sight or 500 yards from an occupied dwelling; and 
permanent duck blinds, boat moorages, or any seasonal object if 
out-of-sight or 500 yards from an occupied building.171  Galt also 
objected to the “right” to use a dry streambed as a right-of-way; 
however here, Galt misread the statute because this use is 
prohibited.172  Galt also claimed it was unconstitutional to allow 
portage routes pursuant to Montana Code Annotated § 23-2-311 
over private property around artificial barriers.173  In addition, Galt 
asserted that requiring the landowner to pay for the construction of 
a portage route was unconstitutional.174 
 The DFWP responded by arguing that the Legislature 
codified the Curran and Hildreth holdings into the statutes enacted 
by HB 265. Further, that the Curran and Hildreth decisions got it 
right when the court held that the public had the right to recreate 
between the high-water marks of all streams capable of recreational 
use, and that these rights are guaranteed by the Public Trust 
Doctrine as applied to the public use of water by the 1972 
Constitution.  This includes the use of the beds and banks up to the 
high-water mark on all streams and rivers.175 
 The Montana Supreme Court’s decision, written by Justice 
                                                 
171.  Id. at 4. 
172.  Mont. Code Ann. § 23-2-302(2)(g) (prohibits “use of a 
streambed as a right-of-way for any purpose when water is not flowing 
therein.” Id.). 
173.  Br. of Appellants, supra note 168, at 47. 
174.  Id. at 52. 
175.  Br. of Resp’t passim, Galt, No. 86-178 (Jul. 31, 1986). 
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Morrison,176 was part expected, part unexpected, and quite 
confusing.  The Court first acknowledged the appellants, Galt et al., 
were requesting that the new stream access statutes, Montana Code 
Annotated § 23-2-301 et seq., were unconstitutional as a taking of 
private property without just compensation.177  Then the Court held 
the statutes were constitutional in accordance with the Montana 
Constitution and Curran and Hildreth except for four specific 
provisions.178  The Court reaffirmed that the public’s right to use 
waters for recreation includes “the bed and banks up to the high 
water even though the fee title in the land resides with the adjoining 
landowners.”179 
 The Court then announced a general limitation on the right 
to use the bed and bank while recreating that “there is no attendant 
right that such use be as convenient, productive, and comfortable or 
possible” and “that any use of the bed and banks must be of 
minimal impact.”180  The first expression of this limitation seems to 
have no practical meaning, while the “minimal impact” is an 
appropriate caution.  The Court, therefore, reserved to itself the 
right to define the kinds of use permissible.181  The Court, acting 
much like a subcommittee of the legislature, addressed three uses 
of the banks of Class I waters, i.e. rivers either navigable for title or 
potentially navigable for title.  The Court’s qualifications as it 
parsed these uses are important. 
 The Court found the statute overbroad in allowing camping 
where it is not “necessary for the utilization of the water 
resource.”182  In other words, a person can camp only where it is 
necessary as part of a floating trip.  The Court emphasized this by 
observing: “The public can float and fish many of our rivers without 
camping overnight.”183  The Court also found the construction of 
                                                 
176.  Galt v. State, 731 P.2d 912 (Mont. 1987) [hereinafter Galt I]. 
177.  Id. at 913. 
178.  Id. at 916. 
179.  Id. at 915. 
180.  Id.  
181.  Id.  
182.  Id.  
183.  Id.  
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permanent objects like duck blinds on navigable rivers was 
overbroad but, on the other hand, acknowledged duck blinds may 
be necessary on large bodies of water.184  Stated another way, 
seasonal duck blinds, boat moorages, and other objects are 
therefore allowed where necessary on Class I waters.   
In contrast, the Court decided big game hunting between 
the high-water marks on the larger, Class I waters could not be 
“permitted under any circumstances” as a public right.185  In 
addition, the Court found that requiring a private landowner to pay 
for the construction of a portage route over the landowner’s private 
property unconstitutional because “[t]he landowner received no 
benefit from the portage.”186  According to the Court, the state 
should pay because the public benefits.187 
 In conclusion, the Court held that private riparian 
landowners “have their fee impressed with a dominant estate in 
favor of the public.”  This easement must be “narrowly confined so 
that the impact to beds and banks owned by private individuals is 
minimal.”188  The Court in parting said the unconstitutional 
portions were severable leaving “the balance of the statute 
intact.”189  It is worth noting that this decision only affects the 
public’s right to recreate in water flowing through private property.  
If the river or stream flows through state or federal property the 
Galt I restriction would not apply. 
 The contentiousness of these questions is seen through the 
dissenting opinions of several of the justices.  Justice Gulbrandson 
would have restricted Class II waters to floating only like Wyoming.  
Justices Hunt and Sheehy would both have upheld the 
constitutionality of the statutes entirely.190  Both opined that it was 
up to the legislature to balance landowner and public rights if 
                                                 
184.  Id. at 916. 
185.  Id.  
186.  Id.  
187.  Id.  
188.  Id.  
189.  Id.  
190.  Id. at 918, 920, 924. 
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needed.191  Justice Sheehy sharply focused on the fact that the 
majority had restricted public use of Class I banks and streambeds 
below the high-water mark whose title, in his opinion, actually 
reside in the state, not riparian landowners.  Justice Sheehy 
reasoned that Montana upon statehood received title to streambeds 
up to the high-water mark on navigable rivers,192 citing the United 
States Supreme Court in Schively v. Bowlby.193  Therefore, he 
believed that the public use of the high to low-water mark is not in 
the nature of an easement, but rather under the public trust 
doctrine the state owns the strip and may not deed to private 
riparian landowners the ownership of part of the streambed.194   
Citing the seminal United States Supreme Court case 
applying the Public Trust Doctrine to navigable waters that Curran 
relied upon,195 Justice Sheehy argued that because the state cannot 
transfer control of lands subject to the public trust, the part of 
Montana Code Annotated § 70-16-201 enacted in 1895 and 
purporting to transfer title to the low-water mark on navigable 
rivers, was never and could never have been effective.196  Justice 
Sheehy could have also have found support in the Enabling Act197 
and the 1889 Montana Constitution198 since both arguably would 
have required the state to receive fair market value when it was 
                                                 
191.  Id. at 918, 920-21, 923. 
192.  Id. at 921. 
193.  Schively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 48-50 (1894). 
194.  Galt I, 731 P.2d at 921. 
195.  Id. at 921-22 (citing Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. 387). 
196.  Id. at 922. 
197.  The Enabling Act of 1889, § 11, ¶ 4 requires: “provided, 
however, that none of such lands, nor any estate or interest therein, shall ever 
be disposed of except in pursuance of general laws providing for such 
disposition, nor unless the fair market value of the estate or interest disposed 
of, to be ascertained in such manner as may be provided by law, has been paid 
or safety secured to the state.”  
198 Mont. Const. of 1889, art. XVII, § 1 required: “and none of such 
land, nor any estate or interest therein, shall ever be disposed of except in 
pursuance of general laws providing for such disposition, nor unless the full 
market value of the estate or interest disposed of, to be ascertained in such 
manner as may be provided by law, be paid or safely secured to the state.” 
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effected by the enactment of Montana Code Annotated § 70-16-201 
to transfer the high to low-water strip to riparian landowners.  
Thus, in Justice Sheehy’s opinion, the state in HB 265 was 
regulating big game hunting, overnight camping, and construction 
of duck blinds on state owned property.199  Justice Sheehy also 
noted landowners were permitted to fence across state owned 
streambeds in Class I rivers in return for portage routes around 
these artificial barriers.200  Therefore, Justice Sheehy would not 
have found unconstitutional a requirement that landowners pay for 
construction of portage routes around their own fence if the fence 
impeded recreational use.201  However, this conclusion would only 
apply to navigable for title rivers. 
 The author hopes to provide a more in-depth discussion and 
analysis of whether the state or riparian, private landowners should 
actually own the strip between the low and high-water marks on 
navigable rivers, citing judicial decisions in other states, and 
exploring the ramifications of addressing this issue for the first time 
in Montana, in a subsequent publication.  
C. The Following Galt II Case on Attorney Fees 
Article II, Section 29 of the 1972 Montana Constitution 
provides that when a private property owner prevails in litigation 
asserting that his or her property was taken or damaged without 
just compensation, the private property owner is entitled to be 
awarded “necessary expenses of litigation.”202 This includes 
attorney fees.203  The plaintiffs in Galt I were award attorney fees 
by the district court, which was upheld on appeal by the Montana 
Supreme Court.204 
 The Montana Supreme court affirmed, once again, that the 
                                                 
199.  Galt I, 731 P.2d at 923. 
200.  Id. at 924. 
201.  Id. 
202.  Galt v. State, 749 P.2d 1089, 1090-91 (Mont. 1988) 
[hereinafter Galt II].  
203.  Id. at 1092-93. 
204.  Id. at 1090-91. 
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newly enacted stream access statutes were challenged as an 
unconstitutional taking of private property without 
compensation.205  It was important that the Supreme Court was 
very clear in what was at stake in Galt I.  Only a few, severable 
portions of the stream access bill were found unconstitutional206 
and, if left standing, would have “served to take private property 
without just compensation.”207  The court in Galt I then found the 
balance of the statutes constitutional.208 
 In this litigation (“Galt II”) over attorney fees, the court 
found that the requirement for an award of attorney fees was 
met.209  Curiously, the Court held Article II, Section 29 authorized 
an award of attorney fee “under the particular facts of this case” 
and limited “this holding to the facts of this case.”210  Perhaps this 
qualifying language reflected the fact that Galt I had upheld the 
significant majority of the new stream access law and, with the few 
qualified, unconstitutional portions severable, the new law 
remained virtually intact. 
 Throughout the litigation in Galt I, the parties extensively 
briefed and identified the central issue of whether the stream access 
law was a taking of private property without just compensation 
before both the state district court and the Montana Supreme 
Court.  Although the district court acknowledged and decided this 
issue, the Supreme Court barely acknowledged it while addressing 
the issue only by inference in Galt I.  The Court waited until the 
attorney fee issue in Galt II to finally address in one sentence that 
the Galt I decision had actually decided the takings issue.  This lack 
of clarity was frustrating at best and arguably left the issue still 
unresolved or, at least, left the issue to a future court to declare that 
Galt I had actually decided the issue. 
 
                                                 
205.  Id. at 1094 (citing Galt I, 731 P.2d at 916). 
206.  Galt I, 731 P.2d at 916; Galt II, 749 P.2d at 1094. 
207.  Galt II, 749 P.2d at 1093-94. 
208.  Galt I, 731 P.2d at 916. 
209.  Galt II, 749 P.2d at 1093-94. 
210.  Id. at 1094. 
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D. Galt III, A Stream Access Brochure Was Not a Taking 
 DFWP published an informational brochure on stream 
access following the adoption by the legislature of HB 265.  The 
brochure was revised and republished in April, 1988 to incorporate 
the holdings in Galt I.211 The intent of the brochure was to 
summarize the rights and responsibilities of landowners and 
recreationist regarding the stream access law, Montana Code 
Annotated § 23-2-301 through 23-2-322.  The same plaintiff group 
as in Galt I and Galt II requested a declaratory judgment that the 
brochure was unconstitutional and that Montana Code Annotated 
§ 23-2-310(12), the definition of surface water that allowed the use 
of the beds and banks for recreation, was also unconstitutional.212  
The plaintiffs also alleged the entire stream access law was 
unconstitutional because the law creates an unconstitutional denial 
of equal protection of the law in violation of the United States and 
Montana Constitutions by not specifically addressing the 
recreational use of lakes.213  The district court dismissed most all 
the complaints made by the plaintiff as res judicata because the 
parties, subject matter, issues, and capacity of parties were the same 
and the issues had been litigated or should have been litigated in 
Galt I.214  This included the brochure which was attached as an 
exhibit to the complaint in Galt I.215 
 This left just three provisions in the new brochure that had 
been revised in response to the holding by the Supreme Court in 
Galt I plus a new allegation regarding camp fires.216  The district 
court found that the brochure in two places correctly qualified the 
allowance of camping below the high-water mark on Class I waters 
                                                 
211.  DEPT. FISH WILDLIFE & PARKS, STREAM ACCESS IN 
MONTANA, RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF LANDOWNERS AND 
RECREATIONISTS, BROCHURE (Apr. 1988) (on file with Pub. Land & 
Resources L. Rev.). 
212.  Galt v. State, No BDV-88-544, 1-8 (1st Judicial Dist. Ct. 
Mont. Aug. 31, 1989) (Dec. and Order) [hereinafter Galt III]. 
213.  Id. at 6. 
214.  Id. at 7-9. 
215.  Id. at 8-9. 
216.  Id. at 9. 
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as “only permissible when it is necessary for the enjoyment of the 
water resource.”217  The district court found that in “one small 
particular” the brochure appeared to go beyond Galt I by not 
explicitly stating that the use of seasonal duck blinds and boat 
moorages is allowed only if they are both necessary and are on 
large bodies of water.218  After further briefing, the district court 
declined to hold that an informational brochure can constitute a 
taking.219 In this way, the district court denied the plaintiff was 
entitled to attorney fees.220  Thus the litigation over the brochure 
ended, and can accurately be described as much ado over nothing. 
IV.  AG OPINION ON SNOWMOBILING AND TRAPPING  
 In 1985 following the adoption of the Stream Access Law by 
the 1985 Legislation, Attorney General Mike Greehy issued an 
opinion on two questions about the reach of the new law.221  He 
first held that snowmobiles could not be used on frozen surface 
water without landowner permission.  This conclusion follows 
directly from the language of § 2(2)(a) of Chapter 556 that requires 
landowner permission for the use of “motorized vehicles not 
primarily designed for operation upon the water.”222  Next he held 
that trapping of fur-bearing animals between the ordinary high-
water lines of surface waters is not part of the public recreational 
rights under the Stream Access Law because trapping is a 
commercial rather than a recreational activity.  
 The definition of “recreational use” does not specifically 
include trapping and trapping is not included within the catch-all 
phrase “other water-related pleasure activities.”223  Therefore, the 
criminal trespass statutes apply to trapping on private land.224  The 
                                                 
217.  Id. at 9-12. 
218.  Id. at 14-15. 
219.  Id. at 2 (Oct. 26, 1989) (Order on Recons.). 
220.  Id. at 2. 
221.  Mont. Att’y Gen. Op. 41-36 (1985). 
222.  Mont. Code Ann. § 23-2-301(10) (2013). 
223.  Mont. Att’y Gen. Op., supra note 221, at 138, 140 (citing 
1985 Mont. Laws ch. 556 1127 (codified at Mont. Code Ann. § 23-2-301(10)). 
224.  Id. at 138, 140-41.  See Mont. Code Ann. § 45-6-201 (2013) 
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opinion did not make any distinction between Class I and Class II 
waters.225  However, for Class I waters that are navigable for title, 
reliance on the distinction between recreational and commercial 
activities could be questioned. 
V. RELEVANT LEGISLATION AND LITIGATION ON 
STREAM ACCESS ISSUES (1987-1999) 
 With the passage of the Stream Access Law and with the 
Montana Supreme Court upholding its constitutionality, it would be 
logical to conclude that the story ends here.  However, this is not 
the case as the law will be tested politically, legally, and 
administratively over the next 40 years with regulation of 
recreational use of rivers and streams and access being the primary 
threads of the laws continuing history, along with another test of 
the law’s constitutionality in federal court and another challenge in 
state court. 
 This next section, covering the period of 1987 through 1999, 
will be relatively smooth sailing with only a couple of challenges to 
the Stream Access Law itself and some fine-tuning.  However, there 
will be a significant transition to comprehensive authority for 
government, represented by the Commission, to be able to regulate 
recreational use of rivers and streams as needed with growing 
recreational use.   
A. 1987 Legislative Session 
 The 1987 Legislature started with a bill to turn the Stream 
Access Law on its head by restricting non-navigable for title 
streams to floating only, in addition to a bill that claimed to 
incorporate the Galt I holding but either would have made 
                                                                                                             
(If private land is posted, landowner permission is necessary. If private land is 
not posted, a person has the privilege to enter and remain on private land until 
the landowner revokes the privilege by personal communication.); see also 
Mont. Code Ann. § 87-6-601 (2013) (nonresident trappers must have written 
permission from a landowner). 
225.  Mont. Att’y Gen. Op., supra note 221, at 139. 
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significant changes or was just incomprehensibly ambiguous. 
SB 159226 proposed an amendment to the definition of 
surface water in the stream access statutes. The public’s right to use 
the bed and banks up to the ordinary high-water mark of all natural 
water bodies (i.e. all streams capable of supporting recreational 
use) is found in the definition in Montana Code Annotated § 23-2-
301(12).   The amendment would have allowed the use of the bed 
and banks only if a “body of water has been adjudicated to be 
navigable by federal standards.”  This would have been an extreme 
restriction of stream access by allowing only floating on almost all 
rivers and streams in Montana because only a few rivers have 
actually been adjudicated navigable for title.  Rivers that qualify as 
navigable for title, but have not yet been adjudicated would be 
restricted to floating without any wading or walking on the beds 
and banks. The bill died in the Senate Natural Resources 
Committee on a tie vote.227 
 SB 286 claimed that its purpose was to remove the 
provisions declared unconstitutional in Galt I.228  The definition of 
recreational use was amended to provide, or at least imply, that any 
recreational use may be prohibited by law which would be contrary 
to Curran, Hildreth, and Galt I.  Next, the public recreational use of 
surface water “without regard to the ownership of the land 
underlying the waters” was amended to “with regard.”229 The 
meaning of this change was unclear, but likely intended to be a 
restriction.  In addition, the portage provision was extensively 
amended.   
Although Galt I only required that the state pay for the 
physical construction of portage routes, the amendment would have 
required landowners to be compensated for the land used for a 
portage route, a right the public already had.  Finally, distinctions 
                                                 
226.  S. 159, 50th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 1987) (Introduced Bill). 
227.   History and Final Status, S. 159, 50th Legis., Reg. Sess., Sen. 
Bills and Res. 62-63 (Mont. 1987). 
228.  S. 286, 50th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 1987) (Introduced bill). 
229.  Id. (see amendments proposed in the introduced bill 
including changing “without regard” to “with regard” in Mont. Code Ann. § 
23-2-302(1)). 
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between recreational use of Class I and II were removed without a 
discernible reason.  The bill was redrafted on the Senate floor to 
reasonably reflect the Galt I decision, although without some of 
nuance of the Galt I qualifications.230 However, the House 
amended SB 286 by reverting to some provisions which were 
inconsistent with Curran, Hildreth, and Galt I.231  The Senate did 
not concur in the House amendments, the House did not appoint a 
free conference committee, and the bill died.232 
B. Challenge to a Yellowstone River Rule Based on Safety 
Criteria 
 The following litigation in state district court illustrates the 
limitations, prior to 1999, on the Commission’s ability to regulate 
conflicts between recreational users of rivers based solely on safety.  
When HB 626 was adopted in the 1999 session, it added public 
welfare as additional criteria.  The Commission’s rulemaking 
authority was then dramatically broadened.233   
 In 1988, the Commission adopted a rule which placed a ten-
horsepower limitation on motorboats on the section of the 
Yellowstone River from Livingston downstream to Springdale.234  
At the time of the adoption of the rule, the Commission had 
authority to adopt rules regulating use of public waters based on 
health, safety, and damage to property criteria.235  
 A complaint was filed in state district court asking that the 
rule be declared invalid.236  The essence of the complaint was that 
                                                 
230.  Id. (Feb. 25, 1987) (3d Reading). 
231.  Id. (Mar. 30, 1987) (Reference Bill). 
232.  History and Final Status, S. 286, 50th Legis., Reg. Sess., Sen. 
Bills and Res. 110-111 (Mont. 1987). 
233.  See Section V, H infra at 50, discussing H.R. 626, 56th Legis., 
Reg. Sess., (Mont. Apr. 20, 1999). 
234.  19 Mont. Admin. Reg. 2219 (Oct. 13, 1988). 
235.  Mont. Code Ann. § 87-1-303(2) (1987) The Commission’s 
criteria to adopt rules regulating recreational use of waters were “in the 
interest of public health, public safety, and the protection of property.” 
236.  Big Sky Riverboaters, Inc. v. State, No. DV 89-882 (13th 
Judicial Dist. Ct. Mont. June 18, 1989). 
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the Commission had not shown that there was a threat to public 
safety, the one applicable criteria.237 The Department and 
Commission realized the validity of the rule was not supported by 
the administrative record because the facts did not support a threat 
to public safety.  Therefore, plaintiffs, the Department, and the 
Commission agreed to settle the litigation, with the Department 
and Commission agreeing to redo the rulemaking process to either 
repeal, affirm, or modify the rule.238 
 The Commission at the conclusion the new rulemaking 
process decided to retain the rule banning motorboats of greater 
than ten horsepower between Livingston downstream to the U.S. 
Highway 89 because a threat to public safety was now 
demonstrated in this relatively narrow section of the river that 
contains a high frequency of rapids.  The Commission repealed the 
restriction on motorboats between the Highway 89 bridge and the 
Springdale bridge because the river was wider with less recreational 
use and injury to persons was unlikely.239 
C. 1989 Legislative Session 
 In HB 655, the Legislature passed the Smith River 
Management Act which granted DFWP specific authority to 
manage and regulate recreational use of the Smith River.240  With 
this new statutory authority, the Commission had for the first time 
comprehensive authority to regulate recreational use of a river, 
limited to the Smith River however, for addressing competing uses 
and crowding among different recreational users. 
 
 
                                                 
237.  Compl. ¶ 14, Big Sky Riverboaters, No. DV 89-882 (July 21, 
1989). 
238.  Big Sky Riverboaters, No. DV 89-882 (June 18, 1990) 
(settlement agreement); Id (June 18, 1990) (stipulation and order of dismissal 
with prejudice). 
239.  9 Mont. Admin. Reg. 740 (May 16, 1991). 
240.  1989 Mont. Laws ch. 512, 1216 (codified at Mont. Code Ann. 
§ 23-2-401 to 410 (1989)). 
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D. 1991 Legislative Session 
 In 1991, the legislative bills were primarily focused on the 
use of streambeds and banks.  The first, HB 81, was an attempt to 
restrict the use of river banks but was tabled in the House Fish and 
Game Committee. 241  It would have prohibited overnight camping 
and campfires on the banks of Class I waters, and campfires on the 
banks of Class II waters (overnight camping was already not 
allowed on Class II waters).242  The legislature successfully passed 
HB 359 which prohibits the operation of motor vehicles and off-
highway vehicles below the ordinary high-water mark on state and 
federal land, except where the appropriate land management 
agency allows public crossing on designated roads or trails.243  
However, the use must have minimal impact on the ecology and the 
bed of the stream.  Curiously, the prohibition applies to private 
lands riparian to Class I waters, but only to the portion of the 
streambed covered by water even though the private riparian 
landowner owns to the low-water mark, whether covered by water 
or not.   
E. 1993 Legislative Session Considered Authority to Regulate 
Recreational Use 
 The 1993 Legislature considered two bills to clarify and 
expand the authority of the DFWP to adopt and enforce rules 
regulating the recreational use of lakes and streams.  The 
legislature’s first attempt, SB 341,244 would have granted authority 
to the Commission to adopt rules on public reservoirs, lakes, 
streams and rivers “to protect and preserve natural resources, 
preserve the diversity of recreational opportunities, and minimize 
                                                 
241.  History and Final Status, H.R. 81, 52d Legis., Reg. Sess., H. 
Bills and Res. 245 (Mont. 1991).  
242.  H.R. 81, 52th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Mont. Jan.1, 1991) 
(Introduced Bill). 
243.  1991 Mont. Laws ch. 491, 1586 (H.R. 359) (codified at Mont. 
Code Ann. § 61-8-371 (2013)). 
244.  S. 341, 53d Legis., Reg. Sess. (Mont. Feb. 9, 1993) 
(Introduced Bill). 
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user conflicts.”245  The bill would have given the Commission the 
authority to establish the need to restrict or adopt quotas on 
commercial use to accomplish these goals.  The bill was unclear 
who, the Commission or the Board of Outfitters, could actually 
adopt a quota on commercial use.   
This bill was one of the first in a series of attempts to grant 
the Commission more comprehensive authority to manage 
recreational use of public state waters.  The fundamental problem 
was that the Commission’s rulemaking authority is limited to rules 
affecting only public health, public safety, and the protection of 
property, which is very limiting.246  The other bill, SB 297247  would 
have amended the Smith River Management Act to limit the 
maximum group size to 12; require an annual lottery to selected 
authorized outfitters; and prohibit the transfer of individual launch 
permits.   
F. 1995 Legislative Session 
 In 1995, the legislature considered HB 348, a rerun of SB 
341 of the 1993 Session, which granted the Commission the same 
specific authority to regulate recreational use on public waters.  The 
difference was that the number of outfitters or guides on a river 
could be limited by the Board of Outfitting only when the 
Commission adopted rules limiting the number of recreational 
users on a river.248  The bill was amended to ensure that the 
Commission’s rulemaking authority was limited to impacts caused 
by recreational users,249  but it failed on the second reading vote in 
the House.250 
                                                 
245.  Id. at 3:17-21. 
246.  Mont. Code Ann. § 87-1-303(2) (1993). 
247.  S. 297, 53d Legis., Reg. Sess. (Mont. Feb. 2, 1993) 
(Introduced Bill). 
248.  H.R. 348, 54th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Mont. Jan.  27, 1995) 
(Introduced Bill). 
249.  Id. at 2:25, 3:27-28 (Feb. 17, 1995) (2d Reading). 
250.  History and Final Status, H.R. 348, 54th Legis., Reg. Sess., 
H. Bills and Res. 363 (Mont. 1995). 
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G. 1997 Legislative Session 
 In 1997, SB 149251  represented another attempt to give the 
Commission authority to manage and regulate recreational use of 
public reservoirs, lakes, streams and rivers, along with a 
corresponding responsibility of the Board of Outfitters to regulate 
and limit fishing outfitting if necessary.  The bill was the product of 
a committee composed of members of outdoor recreation groups 
and interested persons.252  However the key language was for all 
practical purposes identical to HB 348 of the 1995 legislative session 
except a negotiated rulemaking process was required.  The bill was 
amended in the Senate Fish and Game Committee to ensure that 
any rules adopted could not restrict the rights of riparian 
landowners to access adjacent lakes, rivers, or streams.253  The bill 
passed the Senate as amended but was tabled in the House Fish, 
Wildlife and Parks Committee.254 
H. 1999 Legislative Session – Bridge Access Attempted and 
Regulation of Recreational Use Addressed 
 The 1999 session was eventful with the introduction of the 
first of many bills attempting to address access at county bridges 
and three bills dealing with recreational use of rivers.  The most 
significant bill finally gave the Commission full authority to 
regulate the recreational use of rivers. 
 SB 418,255 introduced in 1999, was the first in a series of bills 
attempting to address the issue of whether the right-of-ways for 
                                                 
251.  S. 149, 55th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Mont. Jan. 9, 1997) 
(Introduced Bill). 
252.  Hearing on S. 149 Before the Mont. Sen. Fish and Game 
Comm., 55th Legis. Sess. (Mont. Jan. 23, 1997) written testimony of Patrick 
Graham, DFWP (copy on file with Pub. Land & Resources L. Rev.). 
253.  S. 149, 55th Legis., Reg. Sess., at 4:20-23 (Mont. Jan. 29, 
1997) (2d Reading). 
254.  History and Final Status, S. 149, 55th Legis., Reg. Sess. Sen. 
Bills and Res. 77-78 (Mont. 1997). 
255.  S. 418, 56th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Mont. Feb. 9, 1999) 
(Introduced Bill). 
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county and state roads can be used to access streams and rivers for 
recreational use at bridge crossings.  The bill declared that 
recreational access to streams was not part of a right-of-way or 
bridge easement unless specifically stated in an easement document 
or unless the state or county has fee title to the right-of-way.256  
Rather, bridge easements would be limited to the width of the 
bridge except for a “secondary, nonexclusive, and nontransferable 
easement” for maintenance and repair.257  As a result of SB 418, 
there would have been very little, if any, access at existing bridges.  
The bill likely would have led to a significant reduction in access 
where a new easement was necessary because many landowners 
would resist access as part of a new easement.  This invented 
concept revising county road easements would appear again and 
again, until finally held in error by the Montana Supreme Court.258   
 There were two significant problems with SB 418, in 
addition to prohibiting access to streams and rivers from public 
bridge right-of-ways that anglers and floaters had used for decades. 
The way the bill was drafted, it appeared to forfeit other necessary 
and critical public uses for right-of-ways, such as power lines, 
telephone lines or cables, sewer lines, and other similar future uses.  
If access to public streams and rivers is already a property right of 
the public as part of the easement, then to abandon this public 
property right, as the bill would do, would be unconstitutional in 
violation of the Montana Constitution Article X, section 11 (1972).  
This section of the constitution requires that public land be held in 
trust and that public land cannot be disposed of unless fair market 
value is received.  Also, if legal access to streams and rivers is part 
of the public right to use streams and rivers for recreational use, 
then to forfeit this access may be unconstitutional as a violation of 
the Public Trust Doctrine.259  The bill was tabled by the Senate Fish 
                                                 
256.  Id. at §§ 1, 3, 4. 
257.  Id. at § 2. 
258.  Pub. Lands Access Ass’n v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of 
Madison Cnty., 321 P.3d 38 (Mont. 2014). 
259.  See supra note 108, referencing the Public Trust Doctrine 
adopted by Curran, 682 P.2d 163. 
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and Game Committee.260 
 In an attempt to regulate outfitting on the Beaverhead and 
Big Hole Rivers, the legislature considered SB 445.261  The bill was 
adopted by the Legislature and would: require outfitters and guides 
to have and display boat tags; limit outfitting on the Beaverhead 
and Big Hole Rivers based on historic use; prohibit outfitting on 
these rivers in a specified section of each river on every Saturday; 
require the DFWP to facilitate a consensus process to develop 
management plans on the Beaverhead and Big Hole Rivers with 
the Commission to adopt the plans through rulemaking; and, 
require the adoption of management plans in a similar manner for 
other rivers where there is concern about use levels, user conflicts, 
resource and property damage, and limited public facilities.262  The 
bill required that where a plan called for reductions in recreational 
use on a river “the reduction will be made in commercial and 
nonresident use rather than in noncommercial, resident use.”263   
Because some provisions of the bill, after numerous 
amendments, were confusing, contradictory, unclear, and this last 
restriction arguably violated the equal protection or the privileges 
and immunities clauses of the United States Constitution, Governor 
Racicot vetoed the bill.264  The veto was not overridden265 and the 
Governor, in the veto message, directed DFWP and Commission to 
initiate rulemaking under HB 626 of the same session to address 
the issues that were subjects of SB 445.  With the passage of HB 
626,266 the legislature addressed potential conflicts between 
motorboats, personal watercraft and anglers, swimmers, divers, etc. 
                                                 
260.  History and Final Status, S. 418, 56th Legis., Reg. Sess., Sen. 
Bills and Res. 237 (Mont. 1999). 
261.  S. 445, 56th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Mont. Feb. 11, 1999) 
(Introduced Bill). 
262.  Id. (Apr. 21, 1999) (Reference Bill as Amended). 
263.  Id. at § 2(5). 
264.  Letter from Marc Racicot, Governor, to Bruce Crippen, 
Senator, President of the Senate, and John Mercer, Representative, Speaker 
of the House, Veto of S. 444 (May 10, 1999). 
265.  History and Final Status, S. 445, 56th Legis., Reg. Sess. Sen. 
Bills and Res. 249 (Mont. 1999). 
266.  1999 Mont. Laws ch. 569, 2544 (H.R. 626). 
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by specifying distances of separation, and no-wake zones through 
the bill language itself or through rules adopted by the Commission.  
The bill prohibits the use of personal watercraft on the upper 
Missouri and its tributaries.267  
 However, by far the most significant amendment in the bill 
was a comprehensive expansion of the authority of the Commission 
to manage and regulate use of publicly accessible waters of the 
state.  This was accomplished simply by adding the term “public 
welfare” to the statutory scope of the Commission’s rulemaking 
authority.  The rulemaking authority, as amended,268 reads: 
 
These rules must be adopted in the interest of public 
health, public safety, public welfare, and protection 
of property and public resources in regulating 
swimming, hunting, fishing, trapping, boating, 
including but not limited to boating speed 
regulations, the operation of motor-driven boats, the 
operation of personal watercraft, the resolution of 
conflicts between users of motorized and 
nonmotorized boats, water-skiing, surfboarding, 
picnicking, camping, sanitation, and use of firearms 
on the reservoirs, lakes, rivers, and streams or at 
designated areas along the shore of the reservoirs, 
lakes, rivers, and streams.  (New amendatory 
language is italicized.) 
  
The term “public welfare” was amended into the bill in the Senate 
Fish and Game Committee.269  As a result, the Commission gained 
complete police powers to adopt rules, as contrasted with being 
limited to adopting rules for the purposes of public health, public 
safety, or protection of property.   
                                                 
267.  H.R. 626, 56th Legis., Reg. Sess., (Mont. Apr. 20, 1999) 
(Reference Bill as Amended). 
268.  Id. at § 3 (amending Mont. Code Ann. § 87-1-303(2)).  
269.  Id.  
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VI.    MADISON V. GRAHAM: ANOTHER TAKING 
CHALLENGE NOW IN FEDERAL COURT  
 In May of 2000, a group of plaintiffs filed a complaint in 
federal district in Montana seeking to enjoin the enforcement of the 
Montana Stream Access Law as it applies to the bed and banks of 
non-navigable waters, specifically the Stillwater River, Ruby River, 
and O’Dell Creek.270  The plaintiffs asserted that the Stream Access 
Law violates their Fifteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution right to substantive due process or, in the alternative, 
denies their right to due process pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  The 
plaintiff’s also claimed the statute is void for vagueness.271 
 The district court started its analysis by applying Ninth 
Circuit precedent that the court must view plaintiffs’ substantive 
due process claim as a Fifth Amendment takings claim because 
there is explicit textual protection under the takings or just 
compensation clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution.272  An “as applied” Fifth Amendment claim would 
have first required exhaustion of state remedies.273  The court then 
stated that the plaintiff have failed to state a claim upon which 
relief could be granted, whether a takings claim or a substantive 
due process claim, because “Montana’s Stream Access Law clearly 
and substantially advances a legitimate government interest and 
cannot be said to be irrational or arbitrary”.274  The court continued 
a listing of reasons the plaintiffs claim must be dismissed, finding 
that the plaintiffs were barred by the 3-year statute of limitations of 
Montana Code Annotated § 27-2-204(1) because their claim of a 
potential loss of property was triggered by either the passage of 
Article IX, Section 3(3) of the 1972 Montana Constitution or the 
                                                 
270.  Madison v. Graham, 126 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1322 (D. Mont. 
2001). 
271.  Id. at 1322. 
272.  Id. at 1324 (citing Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311 (9th 
Cir. 1996) (en banc)). 
273.  Id. at 1324. 
274.  Id. at 1325. 
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enactment by the Montana Legislature in 1985.275  In addition, The 
Court found the plaintiffs are barred by res judicata based on Galt 
I, which was a full adjudication performed by a competent court.276  
The court relied upon Galt II (the attorney fee phase of Galt I) to 
clearly characterize the Galt I decision: “The Galt I plaintiffs 
challenged the Montana Stream Access Law ‘as a taking of private 
property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and 
Article II, Section 29 of the Montana Constitution.’”277 
 Finally, the court concluded that plaintiffs are also 
precluded from asserting their claims by the Rooker-Feldman 
Doctrine.  The doctrine precludes review by a federal district court 
of final adjudication of a state’s highest court or to evaluate 
constitutional claims addressed in a state court’s decision.278  The 
court found that Galt I had reviewed the major federal and state 
constitutional challenges to the Stream Access Law and found the 
law to be constitutional, except for a few provisions and that the 
proper review could have been performed by the United States 
Supreme Court, but no appeal was attempted.279  Therefore, the 
plaintiffs’ claim for relief was precluded by the federal Rooker-
Feldman Doctrine in addition to being barred by the statute of 
limitations and res judicata.280  The court found no merit in 
plaintiffs’ vagueness claim asserting that natural barriers were not 
addressed in the Stream Access Law and a claim that the definition 
of “ordinary high water mark” in Montana Code Annotated § 23-2-
301(a) was ill-defined.281  The plaintiffs’ complaint was dismissed 
with prejudice.282 
 The Ninth Circuit on appeal affirmed the district court 
                                                 
275.  Id. at 1326. 
276.  Id. 
277.  Id. at 1326 (citing Galt II, 749 P.2d at 1090 (attorney fees 
phase of Galt I)).  
278.  Id. at 1327. 
279.  Id. 
280.  Id. 
281.  Id. at 1327-28. 
282.  Id. at 1328. 
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decision holding: that the plaintiffs only alleged facts giving rise to a 
takings claim; that the right to exclude others is a property right 
addressed by the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment; and, that 
labeling their claim as a substantive due process claim does not 
change its nature as a takings claim.  Therefore, under Armendariz, 
the plaintiffs failed to adequately allege a substantive due process 
claim and the district court correctly dismissed their complaint with 
prejudice.283 
 The Ninth Circuit did not address several other grounds for 
dismissal that the district court found because they were not 
necessary to dispose of the case.  The Ninth Circuit did however 
specifically hold the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine does not bar federal 
court jurisdiction when a federal court litigant was not a party in the 
state proceeding, noting that only one of the parties were a litigant 
in the state court proceeding, i.e. Galt I.284  The United States 
Supreme Court denied the plaintiffs’ petition for a writ of certiorari 
on May 27, 2003 ending this litigation.285 
 With the conclusion of this litigation in federal court, the 
Stream Access Law had now been upheld against challenges to its 
constitutionality in both state and federal courts. 
VII. STREAM ACCESS FROM COUNTY ROADS AT 
BRIDGES  
Starting with an Attorney General’s Opinion in 2000 that 
the public had a right to access streams from county road right-of-
ways, the issue had a pin ball journey through the 2001, 2005, 2007, 
and 2009 legislative sessions culminating in the adoption of HB 190 
in 2009 that codified the Attorney General’s Opinion. 
To follow the path of the bridge access issue, it is helpful for 
the reader to keep in mind two central concepts.  One is how to 
accommodate both livestock fencing to bridge abutments without 
blocking access to streams.  The other is which of two competing 
                                                 
283.  Madison v. Graham, 316 F.3d 867, 871-72 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(citing Armendariz, 75 F.3d 1311). 
284.  Id. at 869 n.2. 
285.  Madison v. Graham, 538 U.S. 1058 (2003). 
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paths to take.  One set of bills in the legislature would have virtually 
eliminated access by allowing access only if the original road 
easement documents specifically stated that stream access was part 
of the easement.  Of course, this level of detail was not part of the 
establishment of easements in the past.  The other competing set of 
bills would allow both access and livestock fences.  However the 
devil was in the details, or more accurately in the politics. 
A. An Attorney General’s Opinion on Bridge Access at County 
Roads 
 In the latter part of the 1990s, there was a growing 
controversy over whether recreationists could legally access streams 
at county bridges.  In particular, the controversy over bridge access 
along the Ruby River in Madison County needed to be addressed 
and resolved.  A number of fishers and floaters were in complete 
disagreement with some riparian landowners over access at county 
road bridges to the Ruby River.  The recreationists wanted to fish 
and float the Ruby River starting and ending at bridge crossings, 
but individual landowners wanted to block access from the county 
roads. 
 The history in Madison County starts on September 11, 
1995, when the county adopted Ordinance 3-95.  This ordinance 
essentially provided specific requirements on the use of county road 
right-of-ways to allow landowners to fence to bridge abutments and 
to allow stream access by the public through the fences.  The 
ordinance was challenged in state district court, Kennedy v. 
Madison County, No. 8483 (Fifth Judicial District Court of 
Montana, Madison County, filed May 22, 1996) by some 
landowners.  Madison County repealed the ordinance on April 4, 
1997, to resolve the litigation and because the issue has significant 
statewide impact and importance.  Madison County and DFWP 
decided to request an Attorney General’s opinion as the most 
direct and satisfactory way to help settle the issue. 286 
                                                 
286.  Letter from Patrick J. Graham, Director, Mont. Dept. of 
Fish, Wildlife and Parks, to Joseph P. Mazurek, Mont. Attorney General with 
attached memorandum of authorities at 2-3 (June 11, 1998). 
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 The DFWP and counties needed guidance to resolve the 
issue of whether criminal trespass may occur when the public 
accesses streams and rivers at public road bridge crossings.287  The 
DFWP requested an AG Opinion on June 11, 1998 and included a 
memorandum of authorities supporting a conclusion that the public 
can access streams and rivers from the right-of-way of a public road 
at a bridge crossing.288  The request suggested that a right of access 
needs to be qualified in two ways.  That the counties need to have 
authority to have control over roads as needed for safety and 
parking and that prescriptive use roads could be limited to uses that 
establish the roadway.289  The DFWP characterized public access at 
bridges “as a fundamental and inherently necessary part of the 
public’s constitutional right to use Montana’s streams and rivers for 
recreational purposes.”290  Madison County also requested that the 
Attorney General resolve the issue although the county did not 
take a position or advocate a conclusion.291  
On June 2, 2000, Attorney General Mazurek issued his 
opinion holding:292 
 
1.  Use of a county road right-of-way to gain access 
to streams and rivers is consistent with and 
reasonably incidental to the public’s right to travel 
on county roads. 
 
2.  A bridge and its abutments are a part of the 
public highway, and are subject to the same public 
easement of passage as the highway to which they 
are attached. Therefore, the public may gain access 
to streams and rivers by using the bridge, its right-of-
way, and its abutments. 
 
                                                 
287.  Id., letter at 1, mem. at 1. 
288.  Id., letter at 2, mem. at 25. 
289.  Id., letter at 2, mem. at 25-26. 
290.  Id., mem. at 25. 
291.  Id., mem. at 3. 
292.  Mont. Att’y Gen. Op. 48-13 (2000). 
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3.  A member of the public must stay within the road 
and bridge easement to gain access to stream and 
rivers.  Absent definition in the easement or deed to 
the contrary, the width of a bridge right-of-way 
easement is the same as the public highway to which 
it is attached. 
 
4.  Access to streams and rivers from county roads 
and bridges is subject to the valid exercise of the 
county commission’s police power and its statutory 
power to manage county roads. 
 
5.  Access to streams and rivers from county roads 
and bridges created by prescription is dependent 
upon the uses of the road during the prescriptive 
period. 
 
In the text of the opinion, Attorney General Mazurek 
recognized the connection between access at bridges and the 
public’s constitutional right to use all streams and rivers capable of 
recreational use.293  In summary, Attorney General reasoned that 
using a public right-of-way, the road, to access a stream or river, 
which is another public right-of-way, “is consistent with and 
reasonable incidental to the public’s right to travel on county 
roads.”294  However, the opinion was erroneous in holding that the 
uses of prescriptive roads depended on the uses during the 
prescriptive period.295 
B. Bridge Access Attempted in the 2001, 2005, and 2007 
Legislative Sessions 
 The 2001 controversy centered around a recurring theme: 
                                                 
293.  Id. at 4. 
294.  Id. at 5. 
295.  Id. at 1, holding 5; Pub. Lands Access Ass’n, 321 P.3d at 44-
54 (use of a prescriptive road is for all public road purposes although the width 
of the right-of-way depends on use during the prescriptive use period). 
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access to county bridges.  The apparent intent of HB 528296 was to 
codify a portion of the Attorney General’s (“AG”) opinion that the 
public can generally access streams and rivers from county right-of-
ways at bridge crossings.297  However, the AG did recognize that 
this access “is subject to the valid exercise of the county 
commission’s police power and its statutory power to manage 
county roads.”298  The AG found that the authority of county 
commissions to control the use of roads is for the purpose of safety 
and parking.299 
 HB 528 would have faithfully codified the portion of the 
AG’s opinion dealing with control of county roads for safety and 
parking, with one exception.  The last amendatory sentence in the 
introduced bill arguably went much further by authorizing county 
commissions to restrict public access to waterways at bridge 
crossings “if the restrictions are related to public health, safety, or 
welfare.”300  This authority might have allowed county commissions 
to go beyond the primary focus of the bill by closing off access at 
their discretion.  The sentence was amended out in the House State 
Administration Committee.301 The bill passed out of the committee, 
but died on second reading in the House.302 
The 2005 Session continued the controversy of fences for 
livestock control at bridges where the same fences can prevent or 
inhibit public access to the underlying stream.  Two bills failed, one 
that ignored the potential for fences to be barriers while the other 
was overreaching.  However, the most significant bill, which 
prevents the abandonment of public access to public waters, passed.  
 If passed, HB 133 would have allowed a landowner to 
extend a fence from the road right-of-way to a county road bridge 
                                                 
296.  H.R. 528, 57th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Mont. Feb. 9, 2001) 
(Introduced Bill).  
297.  Mont. Atty’y Gen. Op., supra note 292. 
298.  Id. at 1. 
299.  Id. at 8. 
300.  H.R. 528, supra note 296 at 2:3-5 (Introduced Bill). 
301.  Id. at 2:3-5 (2d Reading). 
302.  History and Final Status, H.R. 528, 57th Legis., Reg. Sess., 
H. Bills and Res. 512 (Mont. 2001). 
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abutment.303  A fence could be used to control livestock or it could 
be constructed to obstruct or prevent access to a stream.  The bill 
was opposed because of the latter potential purpose.304  An 
amendment was prepared for the purpose of requiring that the 
fence would not block public access.305  The bill was then tabled in 
the House Local Government Committee.306 
 The most significant stream access bill of the 2005 session 
was HB 269.307  An existing statute already required that where a 
county road which provides access to public land is abandoned, 
another public road must provide “substantially the same access.”308  
The same requirement applied for state highways.309  Because the 
public has an easement to use the bed and banks for recreation,310 
under these circumstances, both statutes may already have applied 
if the easement for recreational use qualifies as public land.  
However, there was a growing controversy and concern over when 
a county road may be rerouted and where access is restricted in an 
agreement with the landowner at the new bridge right-of-way.311 
 HB 269 amended both statutes to provide or clarify that 
when a county or state highway right-of-way provides existing legal 
access to public water, including access for recreational use, and the 
road or highway is abandoned, another road or highway must 
                                                 
303.  H.R. 133, 59th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Mont. Dec, 20, 2004) 
(Introduced Bill). 
304.  Open FAX from MGTU to DFWP (Jan. 17, 2015) (copy on 
file with Pub. Land & Resources L. Rev.). 
305.  H.R. 133, supra note 303 (prepared amendments HB 13301 
ads for Rep. Clark) (copy on file with Pub. Land & Resources L. Rev.). 
306.  History and Final Status, H.R. 133, 59th Legis., Reg. Sess., 
H. Bills and Res. 276 (Mont. 2005). 
307.  H.R. 269, 59th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Mont. Jan. 11, 2005) 
(Introduced Bill). 
308.  Mont. Code Ann. § 7-14-2615 (2005). 
309.  Mont. Code Ann. § 60-2-107 (2005). 
310.  Galt I, 731 P.2d at 916. 
311.  See, e.g., Hearing on H.R. 269 Before the S. Comm. on Fish 
and Game, 59th Legis. Sess. (Mont. Mar. 8, 2005) (written testimony of M. Jeff 
Hagener, Director, DFWP) (copy on file with Pub. Land & Resources L. 
Rev.). 
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provide substantially equivalent access.312  Therefore legally, and in 
theory, when a county road is rerouted with a new bridge at a new 
location, there must be access to the stream or river from the new 
bridge right-of-way.  The bill passed and was signed by the 
Governor.313 
 During the same session, another bill in an ongoing effort to 
address access at bridges was considered.  Bridge access legislation 
starting with SB 148 in 1999 would continue in numerous bills until 
finally HB 190 passed in 2009.  Generally, the issues were stream 
access at bridges and fences as potential barriers to access. 
 HB 560,314 as introduced, proposed to codify the Attorney 
General’s opinion that county road and bridge right-of-ways 
provide public access to stream and rivers.  The Attorney General 
Opinion holdings were proposed verbatim.315  Pursuant to Montana 
Code Annotated § 23-2-311(2), landowners are allowed to fence 
across streams to control livestock or manage property. However, 
this bill would authorize the DFWP to abate dangerous or 
hazardous fences across streams so that floaters would not be 
harmed or their property damaged.316 The bill also would grant 
authority to the DFWP to issue declaratory rulings on whether: a 
stream is capable of recreational use; whether a particular surface 
water is off-limits to public recreational use because it is a stock 
pond or private impoundment; or, whether a particular surface 
water is off-limits because it is a ditch diverting water for beneficial 
use.317   
 Extensive amendments were considered, primarily 
addressing landowner fences from the edge of the right-of-way to 
bridge abutments.  The amendments would have conditioned the 
                                                 
312.  H.R. 269 59th Legis., Reg. Sess., § 1 (Mont. Mar. 23, 2005) 
(Enrolled Copy) (amending Mont. Code Ann. § 7-14-2615(3)); Id. at § 2 
(amending Mont. Code Ann. § 60-2-107(4)). 
313.  2005 Mont. Laws ch. 168, 591. 
314.  H.R. 560, 59th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Mont. Feb. 5, 2005) 
(Introduced Bill). 
315.  Id. at §2, 3; Mont. Att’y Gen. Op., supra note 292. 
316.  H.R. 560, supra note 314, at 2:22-27. 
317.  Id. at §3. 
  
 
132      PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW       Vol. 36 
 
 
fences by requiring that public access to the streams or rivers was 
substantially the same as existed prior to the erection of the 
fence.318  The bill died in the House Fish, Wildlife and Parks 
Committee.319 
 The 2007 Session was particularly frustrating for the efforts 
to resolve the dilemma of fences and access at county bridges, with 
the failure of all four bridge access bills that were introduced.  A 
reasonable conclusion is that the opposing factions were not yet 
ready to compromise. 
 SB 78320 as introduced in 2007 was controversial.  As 
introduced, SB 78 allowed fences to angle from a landowner’s fence 
on the right-of-way line to a bridge abutment for the purpose of 
controlling livestock.  However, the fence could not make access to 
the underlying stream more “difficult or dangerous than without 
the fence.”321  There were provisions for cost reimbursements to 
landowners who added gates, stiles, or other methods to ensure 
public access.  The Board of County Commissioners and DFWP 
could alter or remove a fence that did not qualify, and an 
arbitration process was set out to resolve disputes.322  The bill also 
attempted to codify the AG’s Opinion that the recreating public 
could access a stream or river at bridge crossings.323   
 FWP worked with county Commissioners, Trout Unlimited, 
the Montana Wildlife Federation and others to draft amendments 
to address concerns with the language in the introduced bill.324  The 
amendments were adopted by the Senate Fish and Game 
                                                 
318.  Id. (March 15, 2005) (proposed amendments HB 056007, 
ads) (copy on file with Pub. Land & Resources L. Rev.). 
319.  History and Final Status, H.R. 560, 59th Legis., Reg. Sess., 
H. Bills and Res. 415 (Mont. 2005). 
320.  S. 78, 60th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Mont. Dec. 12, 2006) 
(Introduced Bill).  
321.  Id. at §§ 1(4), 3(1)(b). 
322.  Id. at § 3, at 2-10. 
323.  Id. at § 2. 
324.  Hearing on S. 78 Before the S. Comm. on Fish and Game, 
60th  Legis. Sess. (Mont. Jan. 18. 2007) (written testimony of Chris Smith, 
Chief of Staff, DFWP) (copy on file with Pub. Land & Resources L. Rev.). 
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Committee and rewrote the bill.325  The revised bill would allow a 
fence that did “not prevent public access or provides improved 
access.”  “Prevent public access” was defined in the bill as a fence 
that creates a barrier or makes access more difficult.326  The other 
provision of the introduced bill remained essentially intact. 
 When the bill got to the House Fish, Wildlife and Parks 
Committee, the Committee amended the bill, not only to gut it, but 
to gut the holdings of the AG’s Opinion as well.  The most 
egregious amendment from the viewpoint of supporters of stream 
access, was to prohibit access at bridges except when the road or 
bridge easement itself specifically allowed recreational users to 
access the stream or river.327  In practical terms, this meant there 
would be no public access unless the landowner allowed it.  
Immediately following the adoption of these amendments, the bill 
was tabled.328 
 This is an appropriate place to describe why fences to bridge 
abutments matter.  From a landowner’s perspective, the most 
practical fencing to control livestock is to fence directly from the 
fencing along the right-of-way to the bridge abutment.  However, 
under Montana Code Annotated § 7-14-2134, such a fence across 
the county road easement would be illegal as an encroachment.  In 
spite of the illegality, landowners have traditionally fenced to the 
bridge abutment.  The other option, the legal one, would be to 
continue fencing across the stream along the right-of-way line.  This 
fencing would be more difficult to construct and most likely would 
need to be repaired or replaced after each spring run-off. 
 From the perspective of recreationists, especially those 
floating, a fence upstream or downstream of a bridge is a 
potentially dangerous hazard, especially at higher flows.  Further, 
                                                 
325.  S. 78, supra note 320 (2d Reading). 
326.  Id. at §§ 2(7), 4(1)(b)(ii). 
327.  S. 78, supra note 320 (Mont. April 3, 2007) (3d Reading) 
(amendments SB 007801 ads sponsored by Rep. Chas Vincent, for the House 
Fish, Wildlife and Parks Comm. The critical amendment was number 18.) 
(copy on file with Pub. Land & Resources L. Rev.). 
328.  History and Final Status, S. 78, 60th Legis., Reg. Sess., Sen. 
Bills and Res. 46 (Mont. 2007). 
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fences to the bridge abutment can be an obstacle to access and, 
sometimes, potentially hazardous.  This is the dilemma that 
supporters of stream access at bridges had, up to 2007, been trying 
unsuccessfully to resolve.  In the abstract it is an easy problem to 
solve, but politically, the issue divided supporters of stream access 
from those who oppose or desired to limit stream access. 
 In another attempt to restrict access at bridge crossings, HB 
642329 would have allowed access only where stream access was 
expressly stated in a petition or dedication creating the right-of-way 
or was acquired by condemnation.330  The restriction also applied to 
any other uses of the county road right-of-way except for 
maintenance of the bridge.  This meant that all other county uses of 
the right-of-way, e.g. telephone lines or fiber optic cables, would 
stop at any bridge crossing.  The sponsor, Representative Milburn, 
then proposed an amendment with a substitute concept:  no access 
at a county bridge unless there is “a court order declaring a 
particular bridge site as a legal access point.”331  The result would 
be no access at county bridges except where access was successfully 
litigated as legal in bridge-by-bridge determinations.  The bill was 
tabled in the House Fish, Wildlife and Parks Committee.332    
 When the legislature successfully removed the $500,000 
limit on a county’s road and bridge capital improvement fund with 
the passage of HB 426,333 the Governor returned the bill with 
proposed amendments that codified the AG’s Opinion on bridge 
access.  The amendments allowed fencing to bridges to control 
livestock if the fence was the “least restrictive to the public’s ability 
to access a stream or river.”  The county board of commissioners, in 
                                                 
329.  H.R. 642, 60th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Mont. Feb. 12, 2007) 
(Introduced Bill). 
330.  Id. at § 1 (amending Mont. Code  Ann. § 7-14-2112). 
331.  Id. (Feb. 15, 2007) (amendments HB 64201.ads requested by 
Rep. Milburn for the H. Fish, Wildlife and Parks Comm.  The critical 
amendment was No. 6). (copy on file with the Pub. Land & Resources L. 
Rev.). 
332.  History and Final Status, H.R. 642, 60th Legis., Reg. Sess., 
H. Bills and Res. 428 (Mont. 2007). 
333.  H.R. 426, 60th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Mont. Jan. 2, 2007) 
(Introduced Bill). 
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consultation with the DFWP, could impose conditions ensuring 
public access.334  The Governor’s amendments were not adopted by 
the legislature, the originally adopted bill was then returned to the 
Governor who signed the bill.335  As a result, statutory resolution of 
access at bridges would wait for the next session. 
C. 2009 Legislative Session Finally Resolves Bridge Access 
The positive result of the 2009 session was to finally resolve 
legislatively the issue of access at county bridge crossings by passing 
HB 190.  The practical and simpler bill compared to a competing 
bill, HB 26. 
HB 26336 proposed to resolve access to streams at county 
bridges; however, HB 26 was more complicated than HB 190 with a 
detailed process than was unnecessary.  HB 190 was simpler and 
more direct and was the product of a collaborative group that 
included representatives of recreationists, landowners, and 
counties. Also, HB 26 left it up to the discretion of county 
commissions whether or not to require public passage through 
fences that were otherwise barriers.337  The bill was tabled in the 
House Fish, Wildlife and Parks Committee.338 
 Of all the bills proposed addressing stream access at county 
bridges, HB 190339 was the most straightforward, practical and the 
least complicated.  A landowner was allowed to fence to a bridge 
                                                 
334.  Letter from Brian Schweitzer, Governor of Mont., to Scott 
Sales, Speaker of the House, and Mike Cooney, President of the Mont. Senate 
(April 11, 2007) (returning HB 426 with proposed amendments) (copy on file 
with Pub. Land and Resources L. Rev.). 
335.  History and Final Status, H.R. 426, 60th Legis., Reg. Sess., 
H. Bills and Res. 365.  (2007 Mont. Laws ch. 380, 1645). 
336.  H.R. 26, 61st Legis., Reg. Sess. (Mont. Nov. 25, 2008) 
(Introduced Bill). 
337.  Id. at § 2(2)(a) (Board of County Commissioners only 
required to “take any action necessary”). 
338.  History and Final Status, H.R. 26, 61st Legis., Reg. Sess., H. 
Bills and Res. 235 (Mont. 2009). 
339.  H.R. 190, 61st Legis., Reg. Sess. (Mont. Jan. 7, 2009) 
(Introduced Bill). 
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abutment for the purposes of controlling livestock and for property 
management if the fence provided for public passage to an 
underlying stream for recreational use.  The new statutory language 
included a list of acceptable ways to provide for public access, such 
as a stile, gate, roller, walkover, or a wooden rail fence that 
provides for passage.  If there was a dispute, DFWP would 
negotiate a solution with the landowner or just install a suitable 
access modification to the fence.  DFWP pays for the fence 
modification necessary to provide public passage.340 
 A qualifying fence would not be an encroachment pursuant 
to Montana Code Annotated § 7-14-2134 as amended.341  Most of 
the AG’s Opinion on bridge access was codified, including a Senate 
Fish and Game Committee amendment that added a qualification 
that the bill did not “create or extinguish” any right to use a road 
established by prescriptive use.342 
 Further amendments in the Senate Fish and Game 
Committee included limiting landowner liability for persons using 
road and bridge easements to access streams, to acts or omissions 
that constitute willful or wanton misconduct, and that providing one 
access feature on each side of a stream may be sufficient.343 HB 190 
reflected months of collaborative and constructive dialog among 
many interests.344  The bill passed both the House of 
Representatives and Senate by near unanimous votes and was 
signed by the Governor.345 
                                                 
340.  Id. at § 3. 
341.  Id. at § 1 (amending Mont. Code Ann. § 7-14-2134). 
342.  Id. at § 2(1)-(3) (Mar. 27, 2009) (2d Reading, 2d House as 
amended). 
343.  Id. at §§ 2(4), 3(2)(b). 
344.  Hearing on H.R. 190 Before the S. Comm. on Fish and 
Game, (Mont. Mar. 19, 2009) (written testimony of Bob Lane, Chief Legal 
Counsel, DFWP) (copy on file with Pub. Land & Resources L. Rev.). 
345.  History and Final Status H.R. 190, 61st Legis., Reg. Sess., H. 
Bills and Res. 298 (Mont. 2007). These passed and approved amendments to 
the Stream Access Law. 2009 Mont. Laws ch. 201, 1685 (codified at Mont. 
Code Ann. § 23-2-312 (§ 2 of H.R. 190) and at Mont. Code Ann. § 23-2-313 (§ 
3 of H.R. 190)). 
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VIII. THE BRIDGES OF RUBY RIVER – THE CAPSTONE 
OF BRIDGE ACCESS  
 The issue of public access at county bridges and roads, 
where the public road right-of-way was established by prescription, 
was largely resolved by the Montana Supreme Court in Public Land 
Access Association v. Board of County Commissioners346 as it 
addressed a dispute and controversy over access to the Ruby River 
at Seyler Lane and Seyler Bridge.  The other significant issue in the 
case was over whether the district court’s ruling that the public 
could access the Ruby River from a right-of-way granted by deed at 
Lewis Lane road and bridge was an unconstitutional taking of 
private property.347 
 The Public Lands Access Association, Inc. (“PLAA”) 
sought a declaration, starting with a complaint filed May 2004, that 
the public could access the Ruby River from three roads and 
bridges: Duncan District Road established by statutory petition; 
Lewis Lane established by grant or dedication; and Seyler Lane 
established by prescriptive use.348  The district court of Madison 
County denied the public access from Seyler Bridge and Seyler 
Road but granted the public access from Lewis Bridge.349   
Unique to this litigation, the parties stipulated that Seyler 
Bridge and Seyler Lane is a county road right-of-way that was 
established by prescriptive use.350  The district court split the county 
right-of-way for Seyler Lane into a public right-of-way for just the 
traveled portion and a wider secondary easement limited to the 
county for maintenance and repairs that is separate from the public 
road right-of-way.351 
 On appeal, the Supreme Court found that a prescriptive 
road does not have a secondary easement for maintenance and 
repair but, rather, the public right-of-way includes “the areas 
                                                 
346.  Pub. Lands Access Ass’n, 321 P.3d 38. 
347.  Id. at 40. 
348.  Id. at 40. 
349.  Id. at 40-41. 
350.  Id. at 41. 
351.  Id. at 42. 
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necessary to support and maintain the road, as well as land needed 
to make the road safe and convenient for public use.”352  The Court 
distinguished public road easement case law from cases involving 
private easements.353  The Court agreed with authorities from other 
states, that the width of a county road extends beyond the traveled 
way.354 
 The Court then turned to the width of a prescriptive road, 
holding that the minimum sixty-foot road width otherwise required 
by statute355 does not apply to prescriptive use roads.356  The 
“character and extent” of its use, the land necessary to support and 
maintain the road, and “historical evidence of the nature of the 
enjoyment by which the public acquired the right-of-way” are the 
factors the district court, on remand, was directed to consider in 
determining the width of Seyler Land, a prescriptive use road.357  
The width “must be sufficient to encompass the incidents necessary 
to enjoying, supporting and maintaining the roadway.”358 
 The Court found that recreational use could be considered 
as a factor in determining the width of the right-of-way acquired by 
prescriptive use.  However, the evidence of recreational access to 
Ruby River will need to pre-date the 1985 statute prohibiting 
prescriptive use across private property to reach a stream.359  
Recreational use would need “to be established through clear and 
convincing evidence for the requisite statutory period.”360 
 The next holding of the Supreme Court was the most 
significant.  The Court did not limit road usage to the historic uses 
establishing the right-of-way but to uses incident to the historic use 
and those “that are reasonably foreseeable.”361  This would include 
                                                 
352.  Id. 
353.  Id. at 42-43. 
354.  Id. at 43-44. 
355.  Mont. Code Ann. § 7-14-2112(1). 
356.  Pub. Lands Access, 321 P.3d at 44-45. 
357.  Id.  
358.  Id. at 45. 
359.  Id. at 46 (citing Mont. Code. Ann. § 23-2-322(2)(b)). 
360.  Id. 
361.  Id. at 49. 
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foot travel, including access to the Ruby River as reasonably 
foreseeable.362  By defining the scope of public prescription roads to 
include all reasonable foreseeable future uses for a public roadway, 
the decision made prescriptive public roads useful as public roads 
into the future, rather than a liability for a county.   For example, if 
a road is limited to historic uses, installing buried power lines or 
telephone lines would not be possible without the permission of 
every landowner along the way or condemnation every time a new 
use is made of the road. 
 The last issue was raised by Mr. Kennedy, a landowner at 
Lewis Lane and Bridge, who intervened in this litigation.363 Specific 
to this issue, the county road deed for Lewis Lane dedicated the 
right-of-way to public use whether in the form of a fee or 
easement.364  Regardless, Mr. Kennedy claimed the right of use that 
was granted never intended recreational access to the Ruby River.  
Second, he claimed the district court’s decision allowing access at 
Lewis Lane was an unconstitutional taking of private property 
because he owned the riverbed underlying the public right-of-
way.365 
 The court held that a grant of a right-of-way is for those 
public uses “known at the time of the dedication, but also to those 
justified by a lapse of times and change of conditions.”366  In 
summary, the grant was for all public highway purposes, then and in 
the future. 
 On the second issue, the Court found no taking for two 
reasons.  Kennedy’s predecessor had granted the “swath of riverbed 
underlying the bridge and within the right-of-way to the public.”  
Second, citing to Curran, Hildreth, and Galt I, it is “settled law in 
Montana that the public may use the beds of non-navigable rivers, 
up to the high water mark, for recreation.”  Therefore, by 
precedent, recreational “public use does not constitute 
                                                 
362.  Id. 
363.  Id. at 40. 
364.  Id. at 50-51. 
365.  Id. at 50. 
366.  Id. (citing Bolinger v. Bozeman, 439 P.2d 1062, 1069 (Mont. 
1972) (quoting Wattson v. Eldridge, 278 P.236, 238 (Cal. 1929)). 
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compensable taking of private property.”367  The Court observed 
that the Montana Constitution “provides the state owns the water 
for the benefit of its people, and places no limits on their use.”368  In 
light of this provision, the public use right is described as not an 
interest in the landowner’s property, but as a physical reality that 
“some ‘minimal contact’ with the banks and beds of rivers is 
generally necessary.”369 
 The Court distinguished ownership of the water and its use 
from ownership of the underlying land: “Some insignificant use of 
the riverbeds and river banks is, and always has been, necessary to 
the public’s use and enjoyment of its resource.  That use does not 
amount to an easement or any other ‘interest’ in land.”370  The 
Court referred to Hildreth to conclude, “that no taking of private 
property occurs in public use of beds and banks of waters up to the 
high water mark because title does not pass with the use right.”371  
The Court summarized its holding: “Kennedy never owned a 
property right that allowed him to exclude the public from using its 
water resource, including the riverbed and banks up to the high-
water mark.  Nothing has been taken from him.”372  
 This Ruby River access decision is notable for the nature of 
the issues it resolved and the manner in which it was accomplished.  
In this decision, established prescriptive use roads are recognized as 
county roads for all public road purposes now and in the future.  
The decision means that county commissioners do not face a 
dilemma over the management and use of a county road that was 
never formally dedicated because of a narrow limitation on public 
use.  The court also affirmed that a county road acquired in a 
                                                 
367.  Id. at 51 (citing Curran, 682 P.2d at 171; Hildreth, 684 P.2d at 
1091; Galt I, 731 P.2d at 916). 
368.  Id. at 52 (citing Mont. Const. art IX, § 3(3)). 
369.  Id. (referencing Galt I, 731 P.2d at 915). 
370.  Id. at 53; see Mont. Code Ann. § 23-2-309 (“The provisions 
of this part and the recreational uses permitted by 23-2-302 do not affect the 
title ownership of the surface waters, the beds, and the banks of any navigable 
or non-navigable waters or the portage routes within the state.” Id.). 
371.  Pub. Lands Access, 321 P.3d at 53. 
372.  Id. 
  
 
2015                     A REMARKABLE ODYSSEY                          141 
 
 
formal manner, such as a dedication, grant or condemnation, can be 
used for all public road purposes now or in the future.  Importantly, 
public use now includes access to streams.   
Except for the detail of the width of a prescriptive road, 
PLAA just capped the saga of public access to streams at county 
bridge crossings with final legal recognition.  As a final bonus, the 
Montana Supreme Court opinion authored by Justice Michael 
Wheat, has carefully, explicitly and definitely explained that the 
Stream Access Law is not a taking of private property.  The 
previous Montana Supreme Court decisions with similar holdings 
lacked the clarity and completeness of PLAA.  
IX.   THE MITCHELL SLOUGH – DITCH OR BRANCH OF 
THE BITTERROOT RIVER  
 The story of the Mitchell Slough has state-wide implications 
because irrigators on one side of a braided river historically have 
attached their headgate and ditch to the near side-channel as they 
are physically constrained to do. Therefore, the physical 
circumstances of Mitchell Slough are replicated in other rivers.  The 
issue was whether or not the side-channel itself can be converted to 
a privately owned “ditch,” albeit a “fishing ditch.” 
The controversy over the status of the Mitchell Slough was 
finally resolved by the Montana Supreme Court373 finding that the 
Mitchell Slough qualifies as a natural, perennially flowing stream 
subject to the jurisdiction of the Natural Streambed and Land 
Preservation Act of 1972, commonly known as the 310 Law, and is 
subject to stream access and public recreation as provided by the 
Stream Access Law.374  This dispute had been going on for years 
with some landowners riparian to Mitchell Slough, and their 
representatives, insisting the watercourse should be called “Mitchell 
Ditch.” 
 The Mitchell Slough is in Ravalli County east of the 
Bitterroot River between Hamilton and Stevensville.  It leaves the 
                                                 
373.  Bitterroot River Protective Ass’n, Inc. v. Bitterroot 
Conservation Dist., 198 P.3d 219 (Mont. 2008). 
374.  Id. at 232, 242. 
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East Fork of the Bitterroot River meandering in a 
north/northeasterly direction for approximately fifteen miles before 
rejoining the Bitterroot River, having first split into an east and a 
west channel.  The Mitchell Slough’s original confluence with the 
East Fork was supplemented by a concrete diversion structure 
constructed by the three primary ditch companies in 1915.  Later 
the ditch companies in the 1940’s constructed the Tucker headgate 
a quarter-mile upriver on the East Fork and dug a quarter-mile 
canal to reconnect the East Fork to the Mitchell Slough’s channel, 
all to ensure a dependable water flow in the Mitchell Slough.375 
 This review will concentrate primarily on the stream access 
issue, although the 310 Law and stream access issues are linked 
together procedurally.  The Bitterroot Conservation District, in an 
administrative declaratory ruling process, determined that the 
Mitchell (the courts sometimes referred to the watercourse as the 
Mitchell rather than Mitchell Slough or Mitchell Ditch) was not a 
natural perennial - flowing stream subject to the 310 Law.376  This 
decision was appealed to the Twenty-First Judicial Court, Ravalli 
County, by the Bitterroot River Protective Association (“BPPA”), 
but the Montana DFWP did not appeal the decision of the 
Bitterroot Conservation District.  BPPA’s complaint in district 
court also claimed the Mitchell Slough was open to recreational 
access under the Stream Access Law.  Groups of landowners 
intervened, along with three primary irrigation companies, Etna 
Ditch, Webfoot Ditch, and Union Ditch.  Some of the landowners 
cross-claimed for a declaration that the Mitchell Slough was not 
subject to the Stream Access Law. DFWP was joined as an 
involuntary plaintiff for the Stream Access Law issue.377  Both 
BRPA and DFWP appealed the district court’s decision holding 
that the Mitchell Slough was not subject to stream access.378 Thus, 
the two issues were joined in one case. 
 In the end, the district court’s holding that Mitchell Slough 
was not subject to the 310 Law was reversed by the Montana 
                                                 
375.  Id. at 223, 238-39. 
376.  Id. at 222.  
377.  Id. at 222-23. 
378.  Id. at 223. 
  
 
2015                     A REMARKABLE ODYSSEY                          143 
 
 
Supreme Court.379  Although this was a significant decision by the 
Court, the subject of this article is the Stream Access Law. Thus, 
the thrust of this section will concentrate on that issue. 
 The following are the significant facts that the Supreme 
Court relied upon:   
 The Mitchell Slough was designated as the “Right Fork of 
the St. Mary’s Fork of the Bitterroot River” on the 1872 
Government Land Office (“GLO”) survey map and remains in 
partially the same location as in 1872.380  “Certain portions of the 
Mitchell Slough have been rerouted, redirected, and controlled by 
humans to the extent that the Mitchell Slough does not follow the 
same path it may otherwise have naturally followed without 
intervention.”381  There was enough water in Mitchell Slough to 
supply water to the Union, Etna, and Webfoot irrigation ditches in 
the 1800’s.382  The Etna Ditch and headgate was constructed and 
connected to Mitchell Slough in 1871, the Union Ditch in 1889, and 
the Webfoot Ditch in 1871.383  The present day flows in the Mitchell 
Slough in the non-irrigation season were measured in a February 
2001 U.S. Geological Survey, starting with a flow of 18.2 cubic feet 
per second (“c.f.s.”) at the closed Tucker headgate and ending with 
a discharge of approximately 60.49 c.f.s. back into the Bitterroot 
River from the east and west channels and Brushy Creek (a third 
braid of Mitchell Slough) for an increase in flow of about 42.25 
c.f.s.384 
The Court defined the task before it as follows: 
 
Three statutory phrases of the SAL (Stream Access 
Law) are at issue and must be satisfied for the 
                                                 
379.  Id. at 233. 
380.  Id. at 224. 
381.  Id. 
382.  Id. at 238-39. 
383.  Br. of Involuntary Pl. and Appellant Mont. Dept. of Fish, 
Wildlife and Parks at 5, Bitterroot River Protective Ass’n, 198 P.3d 219 (Nov. 
15, 2006) (citing trial exhibits based on the Ravalli County Water Resources 
Survey). 
384.  Bitterroot River Protective Ass’n, 198 P.3d at 239. 
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Mitchell to be subject to public recreational use.  
They are essentially as follows: that the Mitchell is 1) 
a natural water body 2) capable of recreational use 
and 3) not diverted away from a natural water body 
through a manmade conveyance system - one of the 
SAL’s exceptions.385 
 
 The Court started with an acknowledgement that “whether 
the Mitchell is a natural water body for purpose of the SAL is 
ultimately a conclusion of law.”386  The Court concluded “that the 
district court’s dictionary-based definition which essentially 
requires a pristine river unaffected by humans in order to be 
deemed “natural,” results in an absurdity: for many Montana 
waters, the SAL would prohibit the very access it was enacted to 
provide.”387  The Court then stepped through an analysis first of the 
nature of water in Mitchell Slough that in some way had been 
influenced by humans through upriver diversion and ditch systems, 
resulting in irrigation waste water and return flow that the district 
court considered “artificial” and “not natural.”388  The Court 
concluded “the Mitchell serves as a watercourse from which such 
water can be again appropriated” requiring “the conclusion that the 
Mitchell is a watercourse flowing in a ‘natural channel.’”389 
 Next the Court considered whether the Mitchell Slough is 
“a manmade conveyance system” that becomes an exception to 
public stream access if the system carries water for a beneficial 
use.390  The Court reasoned that Mitchell Slough was certainly a 
                                                 
385.  Id. at 236-37. 
386.  Id. at 237. 
387.  Id. at 238. 
388.  Id. at 239. 
389.  Id. at 240. 
390.  The language of the statutory exception and incorporated 
definition set out the required elements: “(2) the right of the public to make 
recreational use of surface waters does not include . . . (c) the recreational use 
of waters while diverted away from a natural water body for beneficial use 
pursuant to Title 85, Chapter 2, part 2 or 3,” and Mont. Code Ann. § 23-2-
301(6)(a) (2005): “‘Diverted away from a natural water body’ means a 
diversions of surface water through a constructed water conveyance system, 
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natural water body 130 years ago, that Mitchell Slough has been 
altered but that it had not “lost its original natural character by such 
work and was transformed into a ‘manmade’ conveyance system.  
Man-improved, certainly, but not man-made.”391 The Court cited 
the “healthy, breeding fish population” found by the district 
court392 and the fact that the water flows through Mitchell Slough 
year-round, not just during the irrigation season393 as elements in its 
ultimate conclusion that Mitchell Slough is subject to stream access 
and public recreation.394 
 In summary, the Mitchell Slough decision, at least for a side-
channel branch of a river before the intervention of humans, holds 
that the watercourse cannot be altered by man into a ditch, that all 
waters, in the watercourse, including return flows from irrigation, 
are part of the “natural flows” of a “natural water body” for 
purposes of the Stream Access Law.  Also, to qualify as a 
constructed ditch carrying irrigation water, the ditch should flow 
with water only during the irrigation season.  In addition, the Court 
held that the presence of a healthy fishery helps to define a stream 
capable of recreational use. 
A. Legislative Attempts to Nullify the Mitchell Slough Decision 
Almost immediately there was an attempt to undo the 
Mitchell Slough decision in the 2009 Session and then again in the 
2011 Session.  However, both bills failed because they attempted to 
assert that a stream altered by humans or a stream with return flows 
from irrigation is not a natural water body, arguments that were 
rejected by the Montana Supreme Court.395  
In the 2009 Session, SB 314 would have had the effect of 
exempting many, if not the majority, of the smaller Class II streams 
                                                                                                             
including but not limited to: (a) an irrigation or drainage canal or ditch.” 
Mont. Code Ann. § 23-2-302(2)(c) (2005). 
391.  Bitterroot River Protective Ass’n, 198 P.3d at 240-41.  
392.  Id. at 241. 
393.  Id. at 241-42. 
394.  Id. at 242. 
395.  See Id. at  219. 
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from qualifying as surface water in which the public has the right to 
recreate. 396  The definition of surface water in the Stream Access 
Law is “a natural water body.”397  The amendments in SB 314 
would mean that any stream that had been altered by humans, for 
example controlling the flow with a headgate or similar device or 
changing the course of a stream so that it remains connected to an 
irrigation ditch, would no longer be a “natural water body.”398  
Also, any water in a stream that was once diverted for irrigation 
and has returned to a stream must be excluded from the natural 
flow of a stream to determine a qualifying theoretical flow.399  The 
result could be that streams in basins with significant irrigation may 
have a zero theoretical flow, therefore, would not be “natural” and 
would be off-limits for stream access.  The bill had every 
appearance of an attempt to reverse the Mitchell Slough decision.  
After discussion with supporters and opponents of the bill, Sponsor 
Senator Laible requested that the bill not be heard by the Senate 
Natural Resources Committee.  As a consequence the bill died.400 
   Nevertheless, in the 2011 Session there was another attempt 
to overrule the Supreme Court’s Mitchell Slough decision. HB 
309401 would have replaced the present clear language in the stream 
access statutes that describe ditches that are off-limits to 
recreational use.  The stream access statutes define a ditch as a 
constructed water conveyance system used to divert water for a 
beneficial use.402  HB 309 would have replaced this clear and 
effective protection for landowner irrigators with new dense, 
murky, and confusing language that would allow private individuals 
to privatize side-channels of braided rivers and streams and, 
                                                 
396.  S. 314, 61st Legis., Reg. Sess. (Mont. Jan. 1, 1009) 
(Introduced Bill). 
397.  Mont. Code Ann. § 23-1-301(12). 
398.  S. 314, supra note 396, at 2:13-18. 
399.  Id. at 2:16-18. 
400.  History and Final Status, S. 314, 61st Legis., Reg. Sess., Sen. 
Bills and Res. 135 (Mont 2009). 
401.  H.R. 309, 62d Legis., Reg. Sess. (Mont. Jan. 21, 2011) 
(Introduced Bill). 
402.  Mont. Code Ann. §§ 23-2-301(6), 302(2)(c) (2009). 
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perhaps, whole streams.  For example, some kind of control 
structure is placed at the head of the side-channel and at some point 
along the side-channel there is an actual headgate for a real ditch 
leaving the side channel, then the former live side-channel would 
become a private ditch pursuant to HB 309.403  Also return flows 
would count as water diverted, and when the total return flows 
from all irrigation in a river basin are the majority of the flow in a 
river or stream, the river or stream would no longer be public.404  
For example, the water diverted from the Bitterroot River during 
the irrigation season is three times the actual flow of the river with 
the result that the flow in the river primarily comes from return 
flows.405  The proposed amendments in HB 309 also define a stream 
altered by humans as qualifying as a ditch,406 although the point at 
which there would be enough alteration would be a subject of 
debate, i.e. future litigation.   
 An examination of the proposed amendatory language 
adding a new subsection (2)(c) to Montana Code Annotated § 23-2-
302, justifies the above conclusions.  Admittedly, the language in 
the amendments is difficult to follow; however, an interpretation of 
the language is facilitated by the facts that these are the very 
arguments that the landowners proposed in an attempt to turn a 
live side-channel of the Bitterroot River, Mitchell Slough, into a 
private fishing ditch.  The Montana Supreme Court resoundingly 
rejected these arguments.407 
 The bill passed the House of Representatives but it was 
eventually tabled in the Senate Agricultural, Livestock and 
                                                 
403.  H.R. 309, supra note 401, at § 2 (amending Mont. Code Ann. 
§ 23-2-302(2) by adding subsection (c)). 
404.  Id. (amending Mont. Code Ann. § 32-2-302(2)(c)(ii) to § 23-
2-302(2)). 
405.  Hearing on H.R. 309 Before the Sen. Comm. on Agriculture, 
Livestock and Irrigation Comm., 62d Legis. Sess., ¶ 3 (Mont. Mar. 8, 2011) 
(written testimony of Bob Lane, Chief Legal Counsel, DFWP) (copy on file 
with Pub. Land & Resources L. Rev.). 
406.  H.R. 309, supra note 401, at §1 (amending Mont. Code Ann. 
§ 23-2-301(6)). 
407.  Bitterroot River Protective Ass’n, 198 P.3d 219. 
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Irrigation Committee.408  This author recalls that over three 
hundred citizens attended the Senate Committee hearing with 
approximately one hundred testifying in opposition to HB 309, and 
only a handful testified in favor of the bill. 
X. AFTER 28 YEARS THE LEGISLATURE AMENDS THE 
STREAM ACCESS LAW TO INCORPORATE THE 
HOLDINGS OF GALT I  
 It has taken the legislature 28 years to incorporate the 
holdings of Galt I409 into the Stream Access Law.  The first attempt 
was SB 286 in the 1987 Session, but the effort was plagued by 
ambiguous language that may have resulted in significant changes 
to the law and by a failure to accurately capture the Galt I 
holdings.410 
In the 2007 Session, HB 721411 was apparently intended to 
amend the stream access statutes to codify the Galt I412 decision.  
However the bill as drafted failed to accurately follow the 
qualifications within the Galt I decision and added at least one 
sentence that could be in violation of the underlying Curran and 
Hildreth413 decisions.  The sentence stated: “Any use of real estate 
that is adjoining the water is allowed with permission or contractual 
agreement with the landowner.”414  If the term “water” means land 
down to the low-water mark, the sentence would have violated the 
holdings of the Curran and Hildreth decisions that allow the use of 
the bed and banks.  The bill was tabled in the House Fish, Wildlife 
and Parks Committee.415 
                                                 
408.  History and Final Status, H.R. 309, 62d Legis., Reg. Sess., H. 
Bills and Res. 307 (Mont. 2009). 
409.  Galt I, 731 P.2d 912. 
410.  See Section V, A supra at 44-46, on the 1987 Legislative 
Session. 
411.  H.R. 721, 60th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Mont. Feb. 15, 2007) 
(Introduced Bill). 
412.  Galt I, 731 P.2d 912. 
413.  Curran, 682 P.2d 163; Hildreth, 684 P.2d 1088. 
414.  H.R. 721, supra note 411, at 3:24-25 (emphasis added). 
415.  History and Final Status, H.R. 721, 60th Legis., Reg. Sess., 
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 Finally in 2015, the Legislature considered for the first time 
a bill, SB 232,416 that was narrowly drafted with its only objective to 
codify the holdings of the Galt I decision.417  The bill prohibits any 
big game hunting between the high-water mark of Class I rivers, 
requires DFWP to pay for the construction of portage routes, and 
allows camping and seasonal duck blinds and boat moorages only 
where necessary for the enjoyment of a Class I river.  The bill was 
passed unanimously.418 
XI. PPL MONTANA – A NAVIGABLE FOR TITLE CASE  
 The final significant decision is one by the United States 
Supreme Court that by its own terms does not affect Montana’s 
Stream Access Law.  However, in opining on the federal test for 
state ownership of navigable riverbeds, it is a cautionary tale of “be 
careful what you ask for.”  The decision is significant because, in 
clarifying the criteria by which rivers or river segments qualify as 
navigable for title, there was the potential for an impact on stream 
access in Montana. 
 In PPL v. Montana, the State of Montana was claiming that 
PPL Montana, LLC (“PPL”) was liable to the state in the form of 
rent for the use of riverbeds where PPL had constructed and 
operated 10 hydroelectric facilities.  Five of the hydroelectric dams 
were on Upper Missouri River along the Great Falls reach, two 
facilities further up river in canyons on the Stubbs Ferry reach, and 
two dams in steep canyons on the Madison River, which collectively 
are called the Missouri-River Project.  The remaining hydroelectric 
dam is on the Clark Fork River and is called the Thompson Falls 
Project.419 
 Montana’s claim to compensation for the use of the 
                                                                                                             
H. Bills and Res. 449 (Mont. 2007). 
416.  S. 232, 64th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Mont. Jan. 28, 2015) 
(Introduce Bill). 
417.  Galt I, 731 P.2d 912. 
418.  2015 Mont. Laws ch. 327 (S. 232) (amending Mont. Code 
Ann. §§ 23-2-302, 311). 
419.  PPL Mont., 132 S. Ct. at 1218-19. 
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riverbeds depends on its assertion of ownership of the riverbeds.  
This assertion itself turns on whether or not the rivers at the 
location of the hydroelectric dams are navigable for title purposes.  
The state district court ruled that Montana owned the riverbeds and 
that PPL owed the state approximately $41 million in rent for the 
use of the riverbeds between 2000 and 2007.420  The Montana 
Supreme Court affirmed.421  The United States Supreme Court 
granted certiorari,422 reversed the judgment, and remanded.423 
 The key issues were the Montana Supreme Court’s 
approach that “navigability for title purposes is very liberally 
construed,”424 justifying assessing a river’s navigability as a whole 
with short interruptions, rather than assessing the navigability of 
the segments where the dams were located.425  The second issue was 
the weight and relevance of the present-day use of the Madison 
River in determining navigability.426 
 The Court, in reviewing the controlling legal principles 
stated: federal law governs questions of navigability for state 
riverbed title;427 under the Equal Footing Doctrine, a state takes 
title to the beds of navigable rivers within the state upon the 
statehood;428 and the determination is of navigability is based on the 
“natural and ordinary condition” of the water at the time of 
statehood.429 
 In determining title to a riverbed, the U.S. Supreme Court 
“considers the river on a segment-by-segment basis to assess 
whether the segment of the river, under which the riverbed in 
                                                 
420.  Id. at 1225-26 (citing PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 229 P.3d 
421, 440, 442-43 (Mont. 2010)). 
421.  PPL Mont., 229 P.3d at 460-61. 
422.  PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 131 S. Ct. 3019 (mem.). 
423.  PPL Mont., 132 S. Ct. at 1235. 
424.  Id. at 1226 (citing PPL Mont., 229 P.3d at 446). 
425.  Id. (citing PPL Mont., 229 P.3d at 446, 449.). 
426.  Id. at 1233. 
427.  Id. at 1227 (citing United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 75 
(1931); United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1935)). 
428.  Id. at 1227-28. 
429.  Id. at 1228. 
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dispute lies, is navigable or not.”430  Incidentally, the Court clarified 
that the need to portage around a river segment “may defeat 
navigability for title purpose”431 and concluded “the 17-mile Great 
Falls reach, at least from the head of the first waterfall to the foot of 
the last, is not navigable for purposes of riverbed title under the 
Equal-Footing Doctrine.”432 Citing evidence in the record, the court 
determined there is “significant likelihood” that some of the other 
reaches where the dams are located may fail the federal test of 
navigability for title and remanded for the Montana courts to assess 
these reaches in compliance with the principles the court 
discussed.433    
The Court also found error in the Montana Supreme 
Court’s reliance on present day use of the Madison River as 
“probative of its susceptibility of use at statehood,” because there 
was no analysis that modern watercraft are comparable to the 
capabilities of the watercraft available at the time of statehood, and 
no analysis of whether the condition of the river had changed since 
statehood.434  Therefore, “reliance upon the state’s evidence of 
present-day, recreational use, at least without further inquiry, was 
wrong as a matter of law.”435 
 The Court expressed its view of the equities of Montana’s 
claim for compensation.  The Court noted Montana filed a claim for 
riverbed rent over a century after the first dam was built, the state 
was fully aware of the hydroelectric projects, had participated in the 
federal licensing process of the dams, and knew that PPL had paid 
rents to the United States.436  The Court said that Montana’s long 
failure to assert title is some evidence for concluding the river 
                                                 
430.  Id. at 1229. The Court cited United States v. Utah, 
summarizing the conclusions of that case “that the Colorado River was 
navigable for its first roughly 4-mile stretch, non-navigable for the next 
roughly 36-mile stretch, navigable for its remaining 149 miles.”  Id. (quoting 
Utah, 295 U.S. at 73-74, 79-81, 89). 
431.  Id. at 1232. 
432.  Id. at 1232. 
433.  Id. at 1232-33. 
434.  Id. at 1233-34. 
435.  Id. at 1234. 
436.  Id. at 1235. 
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segment was non-navigable.437 
 However, the real significance of this case for stream access 
is the court’s response to Montana’s suggestion that denying the 
state title to the riverbeds would undermine the public trust 
doctrine supporting stream access.438  The Court dismissed this 
suggestion as a misunderstanding of the Equal Footing and Public 
Trust Doctrines.439  The Court in a clear distinction between 
respective authority of federal and state law stated: 
 
While equal footing cases have noted that the State 
takes title to the navigable waters and their beds in 
trust for the public, the contours of the public trust 
do not depend upon the Constitution.  Under 
accepted principles of federalism, the States retain 
residual power to determine the scope of the public 
trust over waters within their borders, while federal 
law determines riverbed title under the equal-
footing doctrine.440 
 
 The PPL Montana decision does not affect access to streams 
in Montana under Montana’s very inclusive Stream Access Law.  It 
does however give license to other western states if they choose to 
expand and clarify their stream access laws while balancing access 
with private property rights and interests.441 
Under the Montana Stream Access Law all “surface waters 
that are capable of recreational use may be so used by the public 
without regard to the ownership of the land underlying the 
waters.”442  There is however some difference in allowed incidental 
and necessary use of the bed and banks between Class I waters 
                                                 
437.  Id. at 1235. 
438.  Id. at 1234 (citing Br. for Resp’t., 20, 24-26, PPL Mont., 132 
S. Ct. 1215 (Oct. 27, 2011) (2011 WL 5126226). 
439.  Id. at 1234. 
440.  Id. at 1235 (internal citation omitted). 
441.  Nathan Damweber, PPL Montana v. Montana: From Settlers 
to Settled Expectations, 40 ECOLOGY L.Q. 163, 193 (2013). 
442.  Mont. Code Ann. § 23-2-302(1). 
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(larger rivers) and Class II waters (the smaller rivers or streams).443  
Class I waters are generally defined consistent with waters that are 
navigable for title under the federal test.  However, in at least one 
aspect, the Class I definition is broader because it includes waters 
“capable of supporting . . . commercial guiding using multiperson 
watercraft.”444  Therefore, the Madison River is a Class I water for 
the Stream Access Law although it may or may not be navigable 
under the federal test for state ownership of the bed. 
XII. LITIGATION ILL ADVISED – A CAUTIONARY 
TALE  
 Sometimes issues are not prepared to properly be decided 
by courts until they are sufficiently framed by facts.  The following 
is an example of such litigation.  This case is presented as a 
cautionary tale of a case that could have ended badly for the 
potential scope of stream access.  
 When Robert L. Ryan was denied permission to fish in Lois 
Lake, he filed a complaint for declaratory relief to gain access to 
the lake.445  Lois Lake was created in about 1966 when an earthen 
dam was constructed on Snowshoe Creek. The Third Judicial 
District Court of Montana, Powell County, denied his claim of 
access on the ground that Lois Lake can be accessed only by 
crossing private property that Ryan did not have permission to 
cross.446  Ryan appealed, pro se, to the Supreme Court making two 
claims.  He claimed that he could reach Lois Lake without crossing 
private property and that Montana Code Annotated § 23-2-310, by 
excluding lakes from the Stream Access Law, denies the public of 
the right to use lakes, such as Lois Lake, for recreational purposes 
and is, therefore, unconstitutional.447 
 The Supreme Court only reached the first issue, concluding 
                                                 
443.  Mont. Code Ann. § 23-2-302(2), (3). 
444.  Mont. Code Ann. § 23-2-301(2)(c). 
445.  Ryan v. Harrison & Harrison Farms L.L.L.P., 306 Mont. 534, 
slip op. at 1 (Mont. 2001). 
446.  Id. at *8. 
447.  Id. at *3. 
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that Lois Lake was entirely surrounded by private property and 
thus, Ryan had no right to cross private property to recreate in Lois 
Lake.448  Ryan argued that he could access Lois Lake from 
Snowshoe Creek Road.  However, the Supreme Court found that 
Ryan could not get to Lois Lake from Snowshoe Creek Road 
without crossing private property because the road right-of-way did 
not reach the ordinary high-water mark of the lake.449  Ultimately, 
the Court did not reach the merits of Ryan’s constitutional 
challenge because Ryan had failed to timely serve the Attorney 
General or name the state as a party, thereby waiving his 
constitutional challenge.450 
 Montana Code Annotated § 23-2-310 says: “Nothing 
contained in this part addresses the recreational use of surface 
waters of lakes.”451 It is clear then that the statute does not address 
whether or not the public has a right to recreate in lakes, including 
man-made impoundments on live streams.  The Supreme Court did 
note that Lois Lake is a man-made, artificial lake, “entirely on 
private property and used for watering stock and for irrigation 
purposes” and said the definition of “surface water” limits public 
recreational use to “natural” waterbodies.452  However, this was 
clearly dicta.  The Court did not discuss the limitation on 
recreational use of waters “while diverted away from a natural 
water body for beneficial use.”453 Nor did the court consider the 
statutory definition of “lake” that includes surface water retained 
by “artificial means.”454  Nor was the prohibition on public 
                                                 
448.  Id. at *4. 
449.  Id. at *6. 
450.  Id. at *8; see Mont. Code Ann. § 27-8-301 (1935) (requires 
service on the Attorney General when a statute is alleged to be 
unconstitutional).  See Mont. R. Civ. P. 24(d) (1999) (required service on the 
Attorney General when the constitutionality of a statute is questioned unless a 
state agency is a party.  This rule was replaced in 2011 by Mont. R. Civ. P. 5.1, 
which requires service on the Attorney General when the constitutionality of a 
statute is challenged.). 
451.  Mont. Code Ann. § 23-2-310 (emphasis added).  
452.  Ryan, 306 Mont. Slip op. at 4.  
453.  Mont. Code Ann. § 23-2-302(2)(c) (emphasis added). 
454.  Mont. Code Ann. § 23-2-301(7). 
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recreational use in a “stock pond or other private impoundment fed 
by an intermittently flowing natural watercourse” considered.455 
 A reservoir on a live stream fits the definition of lake but is 
not created by diverting water away from the stream.  Any issue of 
the status of a reservoir on a live stream, as contrasted with a 
storage reservoir on private land created by diverting water from a 
live stream through a constructed ditch, was not decided in this 
case.  Thus, a reservoir on a live stream could meet the test of 
Curran and Hildreth as public water supporting recreational use.  
None of these arguments were raised nor considered in the Court’s 
dicta.  It is telling that the Montana Supreme Court classified their 
decision as noncitable.456   
 When Mr. Ryan contacted the DFWP asking for support, he 
was advised that the factual circumstances surrounding Lois Lake 
offered a very weak framework for raising such an important issue 
with consequent risks that better, more compelling facts would 
avoid.  Mr. Ryan was encouraged not to appeal.457 
XIII. ADMINISTRATION OF STREAM ACCESS  
A. Introduction 
 The political and public support of stream access depends 
upon a fair and even-handed administration of recreational use of 
streams and rivers under the Stream Access Law. This includes 
implementation of bridge access at county roads, determinations of 
necessary portage routes, limitations where recreational use is 
damaging to stream ecology or riparian land, and the adoption of 
use regulations to preserve the enjoyment of the resource.  For 
these reasons, it is important to examine the year-to-year 
administrative efforts by the Commission and DFWP. 
                                                 
455.  Mont. Code Ann. § 23-2-302(2)(b) (emphasis added). 
456.  Ryan, 306 Mont. slip op. at 1 (classified pursuant to Mont. 
Sup. Ct. Internal Operating R. § 1, ¶ 3(c)). 
457.  Telephone interview with Robert L. Ryan, Plaintiff, Ryan v. 
Harrison, Helena, Mont. (March 2000).  
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B. Implementation of Bridge Access at County Roads Pursuant to 
HB 190 
HB 190458 resolved the dilemma of providing for public 
access at county bridges through landowner fences that encroached 
across the right-of-way by angling up to the bridge abutment which 
is the most practical way to control livestock.459 The legislation 
established that recreationists have the right to access streams from 
county road right-of-ways and adjacent landowners have approval 
to attach fences to bridge abutments provided there is public 
passage through the fence to the stream. 
DFWP is required to negotiate with landowners to decide 
on the type of public access that is needed, such as a gate, stile, 
roller, walkover, wooden fence rail or other appropriate structure.  
The new statute sets out a simple process to resolve any 
disagreements between DFWP and a landowner.  DFWP, with the 
cooperation and contribution of any interested parties and 
landowners, provides the materials, installation, and maintenance 
of a public passage modification to a fence.460 
As documented in a memorandum to Regional Supervisors, 
DFWP started implementing HB 190 in 2009 by establishing 
guidelines and working with groups and landowners on bridge 
access projects.461  A glitch in access at bridges developed when the 
Montana Department of Transportation (“MDT”) was constructing 
a new county bridge at a different location that required the 
acquisition of a new road right-of-way.  MDT was negotiating new 
right-of-ways in some cases with landowners who wanted to limit 
public access in the right-of-way agreement with MDT.462  The issue 
                                                 
458.  2009 Mont. Laws ch. 201, 1685 (codified at Mont. Code Ann. 
§§ 23-2-312, 313 (2009)). 
459.  See Section VII, C, supra 66-67, on 2009 legislation. 
460.  Mont. Code Ann. § 23-2-312. 
461.  Mem. from Dave Risley, Mont. DFWP, to Regional 
Supervisors, Bridge Access (June 23, 2010) with attached Guidelines for 
Bridge Access Procedures and Objectives (June 2010). 
462.  Mem. from Harvey E. Nyberg and Bob Lane to Jeff 
Hagener, Director, DFWP, Loss of Public Access at Bridges, (Aug. 29, 2001). 
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was in limbo for some time until MDT adopted a policy for 
addressing stream access at highway crossings.463   
The policy is divided into two parts.  Where no additional 
right-of-way is required or needed, MDT will construct similar 
access to that which existed with the old bridges.464  However, 
where an additional or new right-of-way is required, the policy then 
says MDT will “acquire sufficient right-of-way to construct the 
facility for a highway purpose” and, when the right-of-way is for a 
county road easement, MDT “will attempt to preserve existing 
access by terms of the easement.”465  This policy can be construed 
to have meant that river or stream access at new right-of-ways for 
county roads will not be obtained if the landowner does not agree 
to access.  However, “highway purpose” now clearly includes all 
present and future road uses, including access to streams at road 
and highway bridge crossings.466 
Further MDT is prevented from abandoning access at the 
old bridge crossing unless replacement access is provided.  
Specifically, the county or MDT cannot abandon access at a county 
road or state highway to “public land or waters, including access for 
public recreational use . . . unless another public road or right-of-
way provides substantially the same access.”467  The Stream Access 
Law, as amended by HB 190, says that the public may access rivers 
and streams at a public bridge and county road right-of-way.468  
Therefore, MDT should be required to not just “attempt” to 
preserve existing access but to actually preserve existing public 
access.  Perhaps, and hopefully this is what MDT is now doing. 
 
 
 
                                                 
463.  Mem. No. 02-01 from Joel Marshik, Acting Chief Engineer 
MDT, to All Offices, Stream Access at Highway Crossings (Mar. 1, 2002). 
464.  Id. at ¶ 5.A. 
465.  Id. at ¶ 5.B (emphasis added). 
466.  Public Lands Access Ass’n, 321 P.3d 38. 
467.  Mont. Code Ann. §§ 7-14-2615 (3), 60-2-107(3). 
468.  Mont. Code Ann. § 23-2-312 (1). 
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C. Portage Routes Pursuant to the Stream Access Law 
The Montana Supreme Court and the Montana Legislature 
have addressed barriers in streams and rivers that may otherwise 
interfere with the public’s access along the corridor between the 
ordinary high-water marks.  The public is allowed to portage 
around barriers by going above the ordinary high water mark” in 
the least intrusive way possible, avoiding damage to the private 
property holder’s rights.”469  The Stream Access Law makes the 
same allowance for portage around artificial barriers, but also 
specifically acknowledges the right of the landowner to create 
barriers, such as fences, across streams for land or water 
management, such as the control of livestock.470  In addition, there 
is a process for establishing portage routes when necessary.   
This more formal process for establishing portage routes 
around or over man-made barriers is assigned to the board of 
supervisors of a soil conservation district, the directors of a grazing 
district, or the board of county commissioners.471  As a last resort, 
there is an arbitration process.472  The Stream Access Law does not 
specifically address portage around natural barriers because 
barriers are only defined as “artificial obstruction.”473  DFWP is 
responsible for the cost of any portage route construction and 
maintenance.474 
Initially, there were only twelve requests for establishing 
portages.  Seven were initiated in 1985 and five in 1986.  Ten of the 
requests had been or were being handled directly between the 
DFWP and the landowner.  The Department has provided signs, 
assisted in rearranging fences, provided float gates, etc. Two of the 
requests were handled through the local conservation districts.  For 
example, a bridge over the Beaverhead River was raised to permit 
                                                 
469.  Curran, 682 P.2d at 172. 
470.  Mont. Code Ann. §§ 23-2-301(1), 311(1), (2). 
471.  Id. at §§ 23-2-301(11), 311(3)(a)-(d). 
472.  Id. at § 23-2-311(3)(g)-(i). 
473.  Id. at § 23-2-301(1). 
474.  Galt, 731 P.2d at 916; Mont. Code Ann. § 23-2-311 (as 
amended by 2015 Mont. Laws ch. 327 (S. 232)). 
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boat passage and reduce associated dangers.  This result was due in 
large part to the efforts of the Beaverhead Conservation District.475 
Since this early period, most all portage routes have been 
established by the DFWP and landowner working together.476  
These principles and statutory provisions ensure that the recreating 
public has access and is not barred from using streams and river 
while recognizing and protecting the rights of private landowners. 
D. Regulation of Recreation Use of Streams and Rivers by 
Administrative Rule or Order 
 The Montana Fish, Wildlife, and Parks Commission has the 
authority to adopt rules regulating the recreational use of streams 
and rivers, lakes, and reservoirs,477 and the authority to adopt rules 
for procedures to consider petitions for orders to limit, restrict, or 
prohibit recreational use of surface waters, or to limit the use of a 
Class II stream to its capacity for recreational use.478 
 The general rulemaking authority pursuant to Montana 
Code Annotated § 87-1-303 can be exercised to adopt annual or 
biennial seasonal rules,479 under an exception to Montana 
                                                 
475.  Mem. from James W. Flynn, Director, Review of Activities 
Related to Stream Access, DFWP. (Dec. 1986) (copy on file with Pub. Land & 
Resources L. Rev.). 
476.  Interview with Jim Darling, Fisheries Division, DFWP, 
Helena, Mont. (Mar. 2014). 
477.  Mont. Code Ann. § 87-1-301(1)(b), (c) (Commission 
authority to adopt to adopt fishing regulations and rules governing use of 
water under the jurisdiction of the DFWP); Mont. Code Ann. § 87-1-303(2) 
(specific authority of the Commission to adopt rules regulating recreation use 
of public fishing reservoirs, public lakes, rivers and streams “in the interest of 
public health, public safety, public welfare, and protection of public property 
and public resources.”). 
478.  Mont. Code Ann. § 23-2-302(5) (authority to adopt rules for 
procedures to considering orders to limit, restrict or prohibit recreation use of 
surface waters and to restrict recreational use of identified Class II waters to 
the determined actual capacity of the water.). 
479.  Mont. Code Ann. § 2-4-102(11)(b)(iv) (annual or biennial 
fishing or seasonal recreational use rules are not rules subject to the more 
formal rulemaking requirements of the Mont. Admin. Procedures Act 
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Administrative Procedure Act (“MAPA”), or to adopt 
Administrative Rules of Montana (“ARM”) pursuant to the more 
formal requirements of MAPA.480  All rulemaking, whether 
seasonal rules or ARM rules, and all orders restricting use or 
limiting use on a stream must meet all notice, opportunity to 
participate, and open meeting requirements of the Montana 
Constitution and implementing statutes.  This section will detail 
examples of key rulemaking or orders of the Commission. 
E. Restriction on Outfitting Use of the Big Hole and Beaverhead 
Rivers 
 Following the veto of SB 445 by Governor Racicot in 
1999,481 the Commission initiated rulemaking on the Beaverhead 
and Big Hole Rivers to address increased user conflicts, resource, 
and property damage concerns, demands on limited public facilities, 
and the quality of the recreational experience concerns.482 The rules 
were adopted June 29, 1999 as an interim biennial rule, the biennial 
rule was amended on January 12, 2000, and adopted as a biennial 
rule on May 2, 2001.483  The Fishing Outfitters Association of 
Montana filed a complaint in district court in Gallatin County on 
January 7, 2002 challenging the adopting of the biennial rule on 
procedural, jurisdictional, and constitutional grounds,484 during the 
pendency of the litigation the Commission adopted the rules as 
ARM under MAPA effective April 25, 2003.485 
 The 18th Judicial Court upheld the rules finding: that the 
Commission had authority under Montana Code Annotated § 87-1-
                                                                                                             
(MAPA)). 
480.  Montana Administrative Procedures Act, Mont. Code. Ann. 
§§ 2-4-101 to 711. 
481.  See summary of S. 445, supra notes 261-65 and 
accompanying text. 
482.  24 Mont. Admin. Reg. 3462, 3465 ¶ 4 (Dec. 26, 2002). 
483.  Fishing Outfitters Ass’n of Mont. v. Mont. Fish, Wildlife and 
Parks Comm’n., No. DV-02-32 (8th Judicial Dist. Ct. Mont. Aug. 14, 2002) 
(certification of admin. r.). 
484.  Id. (Aug. 4, 2004) (dec. and order); Id. (Aug. 17, 2004) (j.). 
485.  8 Mont. Admin. Reg. 759 (Apr. 24, 2003). 
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303 to adopt the rules; that the Commission met or exceeded 
procedural and substantive requirements of MAPA; that the 
restrictions in the recreational use rules against nonresidents do not 
violate the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution; 
and the rules do not violate the Land and Water Conservation 
Fund, 16 U.S.C. §§ 406e-4 et seq.486 
 The structure of the rules is to limit outfitters to their 
documented historic use prior to 1999.  On the Beaverhead River, 
the river is divided into five reaches with each eligible outfitter 
limited by an allowed number of launches per day based on historic 
use in each reach.  In addition, there are two different designated 
reaches where in one of the reaches float fishing by nonresidents 
and float outfitting is not allowed on Saturday and the other reach 
has the same restriction on Sunday.  The rules apply from the third 
Saturday in May through Labor Day.487 
 The Big Hole River is divided into eight river zones with the 
headwater zone closed to float outfitting and in the other seven 
zones, one zone is closed to outfitting each day with the zone that is 
restricted on Saturday and the zone that is restricted on Sunday 
also closed to float fishing by nonresidents.  As on the Beaverhead 
River, the rules apply from the third Saturday in May through 
Labor Day.488 
F. Biennial Smith River Rules 
 The Smith River Management Act was adopted by the 
legislature in 1989.489  The Act was administered by the 
Commission until July 1, 2013 when the State Parks and Recreation 
Board (“Board”) was created and delegated the responsibility to 
                                                 
486.  Fishing Outfitters Ass’n, No-02-32 (dec. and order). Appeal 
to the Montana Supreme Court was withdrawn and dismissed. Id. (Dec. 20, 
2004) (withdrawal of appeal), dismissed by, No. 04-808 (Mont. Dec. 21, 2004). 
487.  Mont. Admin. R. 12.11.205, 12.11.215 (2010). 
488.  Mont. Admin. R. 12.11.210, 12.11.220 (2010). 
489.  Smith River Management Act, 1989 Mont. Laws ch. 512, 
1216 (codified at Mont. Code Ann. §§ 23-2-401 to 410). 
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manage the Act.490  The Commission, and now the Board, is 
charged with regulating and allocating “recreational and 
commercial floating and camping to preserve the biological and 
social benefits of recreational and commercial use of the Smith 
River waterway in its natural state.”491  The Board may set 
recreational and commercial user fees, allocate recreational use, 
including outfitting, through a permit system, restrict use to 
preserve the experience while considering landowner tolerance, the 
capacity of the river, and minimizing user conflict and providing for 
a level of solitude.492 
 The Commission has used its authority to adopt biennial 
rules setting private and commercial float trip fees, allocating 
private float trips through a random lottery for the time period of 
April through October 31, limiting the number of commercial 
outfitted float trips per year, requiring floaters to camp at 
designated boat campsites, prohibiting dogs on float trips, and 
restricting fires to metal fire rings.493  The rules apply to the use of 
the Smith River from Camp Baker downriver approximately 60 
river miles to Eden Bridge.  Camp Baker and Eden Bridge are the 
only public access in this stretch of the river, so floaters must camp 
at designated public boat camps and must complete the trip unless 
they have landowner permission to leave the river.  This makes the 
Smith River somewhat a unique experience and helps to explain the 
enactment of specific statutes for its management.494 
 
                                                 
490.  2013 Mont. Laws ch. 235, 816 (H.R. 24) (established the 
State Parks and Recreation Board and changed the Fish, Wildlife and Parks 
Commission to the Fish and Wildlife Commission.  Ch. 235 assigned the 
responsibilities for state parks to the Board that were formerly part of the 
Commission’s responsibilities). 
491.  Mont. Code Ann. § 23-2-408(1). 
492.  Mont. Code Ann. § 23-2-408. 
493.  MONT. STATE PARKS BIENNIAL SMITH RIVER RULE, FEES 
AND RULES FOR SMITH RIVER STATE PARK AND RIVER CORRIDOR (adopted 
Mar. 11, 2015), available at, http://stateparks.mt.gov/smith-river/).  
494.  Fishing Access Sites on Smith River, MONT. FISH, WILDLIFE 
AND PARKS, http://fwp.mt.gov/fishing/searchResults.html?siteId=111479047 
4133&q Type=waterStream&siteType=FA  (last visited June 21, 2014). 
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G. Petitions to Restrict Use Stream-by-Stream 
 The Commission has adopted rules to carry out the 
statutory directive of Montana Code Annotated § 23-2-302(5) to 
consider petitions from persons asking the Commission to limit 
recreational use to protect the ecology of the stream, prevent 
damage to property, or to limit use of Class II streams to the actual 
capacity of the stream.495 
 The rules set out an administrative process and provide 
more detailed criteria for decisions on whether to limit recreational 
use.  The procedures require a written and signed petition, an 
investigation and report by the DFWP, and a timeframe for 
Commission decision making, including public notice and 
comment.496  The Commission can close or restrict recreational use 
when it finds that present public use is damaging the banks and 
adjacent land, damaging the property of a riparian landowner, 
adversely affecting fish or wildlife, altering natural areas or biotic 
communities, or degrading water quality.497  Future use can be 
considered if the anticipated use presents a clear and immediate 
threat.498  The Commission can prohibit, limit, or restrict 
recreational use through orders that are the least disruptive to 
recreational use while still providing the necessary protection.499  
The Commission may, upon a subsequent petition, alter a previous 
order when there are changed circumstances or the alleged damage 
did not occur.500 
 For Class II streams, the Commission can restrict 
recreational use to the actual capacity of the stream or prohibit 
recreational use when the stream cannot support the use.501  This 
author reviewed the files DFWP has kept for each petition.  In the 
first 18 months after the adoption of the Stream Access Law (July 
                                                 
495.  Mont. Admin. R. 12.4.101-106 (1996). 
496.  Id at 12.4.103. 
497.  Id. at 12.4.104. 
498.  Id. 
499.  Id. 
500.  Id. at 12.4.105. 
501.  Id. at 12.4.106. 
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12, 1985 to December 1986), 12 petitions were filed.  Of the 12 
petitions, two were withdrawn, three were granted or granted in 
part and seven were denied.502  Since December 1986, there have 
been three petitions, with two denied and one resolved through 
settlement.503  The following are examples from those petitions: 
 A petition to close Nelson Spring Creek, a tributary of the 
Yellowstone River near Livingston, based on limited capacity and 
impacts to the fishery, was granted in part.  The Commission 
prohibited wading in specified sections of Nelson Spring Creek to 
protect the spawning grounds of cutthroat trout.  The prohibition is 
in effect during the cutthroat spawning and incubation period, June 
15 through September 15 of each year.504  A stream running 
through an existing bison pasture was closed to public recreation on 
the grounds that the bison posed a safety hazard.505  A petition to 
close Ten Mile Creek near Helena was granted in part to close the 
stream to swimming and restrict hunting.506  All other petitions 
were denied.  Generally, the Commission found that the stream, 
including its trout populations, biotic communities, and water 
quality, and the riparian property was not being damaged by 
recreational use.507 
                                                 
502.  Mem. from James W. Flynn, Director, Review of Activities 
Related to Steam Access, DFWP. (Dec. 1986) (copy on file with Pub. Land & 
Resources L. Rev.). 
503.  Review of files maintained by Jim Darling, Fisheries 
Division, DFWP. 
504.  Re: Petition of William D. Dana, (Mont. St. Fish and Game 
Comm’n Jan. 22, 1987) (findings of fact and order) (copy on file with Pub. 
Land & Resources L. Rev.). 
505.  Petition of Bruce M. Cady Requesting Restrictions on the 
North Fork of the Musselshell River, (Mont. St. Fish & Game Comm’n June 
18, 1986) (findings of fact and order) (copy on file with Pub. Land & 
Resources L. Rev.). 
506.  Re: Petition of F.M. Gannon, (Mont. St. Fish and Game 
Comm’n Oct. 11, 1985) (findings of fact and order) (copy on file with Pub. 
Land and Resources L. Rev.). 
507.  Examples of petitions that were denied: Petition of Donald 
R. Siblerud Requesting Restrictions on Mill Creek, (Mont. Fish & Game 
Comm’n Jan. 15, 1986) (findings of fact and order); Letter from Stan Meyer, 
Chairman, Mont. Fish, Wildlife & Parks Comm’n, to Charles W. and Elena B. 
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 Even though seldom used now, this petition process has 
demonstrated its value.  It provides an opportunity for landowners, 
who are concerned that public use will damage a stream running 
through their property, to have their concerns heard and 
considered. In summary, the Commission has concluded that 
generally public recreational use of a stream is self-limiting by the 
capacity of the stream itself, a judgment that is supported by 
practical experience. 
XIV. A REVIEW OF STREAM ACCESS  
 The University of Montana, Public Policy Research 
Institute, conducted a survey in 2005 and published a Montana 
Public Policy Report in 2006 (“Report”), entitled “Stream Access 
in Montana.”508  The survey and report, twenty years after the 
passage of the Stream Access Law in 1985, was intended to identify 
unresolved issues and misunderstandings, while also investigating 
options for moving forward. The following is this author’s summary 
of the Report’s basic conclusions:509 
 
 Most recreationists and landowners say the   
Stream Access Law works well with few 
conflicts with landowners. 
 Many landowners say the Stream Access  
Law adequately protects their property 
                                                                                                             
d’Autremont (Feb. 11, 1999) (denying petition to restrict recreational use of 
the Ruby River. The Commission found no evidence that trout populations 
were being adversely affected nor evidence of damage to property, biotic 
communities, or water quality); FISH, WILDLIFE AND PARKS COMM’N 
MINUTES at 86-88 (Oct. 7, 1996) (Commission voted not to close Sheep Creek 
or Muddy Creek flowing through the property of Renee S. Thompson, 
Petitioner, to duck hunting and fishing.); Report and Recommendations, 
Mont. Fish, Wildlife and Parks (Sept. 5, 1996) (finding no evidence to support 
a fishing closure, although the report noted that retrieval of ducks would likely 
require a trespass) (copies on file with the Pub. Land & Resources L. Rev.). 
508.  PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, UNIV. OF MONT., 
STREAM ACCESS IN MONTANA, MONT. POLICY REPORT 1 (May 2006). 
509.  Id. at 7-11. 
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rights and they enjoy the benefits of stream 
access themselves. 
 Any problems are relatively minor and can  
be addressed by educational efforts, 
legislation, and enforcement. 
 The primary issue is the need to allow fences  
to bridge abutments on county roads along 
with safe and reasonable access to the stream 
or river. 
 
 However, a few landowners saw the Stream Access Law as 
flawed because, in their opinion, it contradicts legal precedent, 
denies landowners the right to control who enters their property, 
creates disincentives for landowners to practice good riparian 
stewardship, is unenforceable because of vague terms in the law 
such as “ordinary high-water mark,” and is impossible to enforce 
against trespass, littering, and other illegal activities.510 
 It is illuminating that the Report’s inventory of specific 
conflicts over stream access have been resolved.511 The Mitchell 
Slough litigation helped clarify what is a natural stream and what is 
a ditch for purposes of public access.  The litigation over access at 
bridge easements on the Ruby River concluded that recreationists 
could access streams at all county bridge crossings including county 
roads established by prescriptive use.  Also disputes over access at 
replacement bridges when the old bridge has been abandoned had 
at least been tempered by a policy adopted by the MDT.    
 The report focused on education to explain the law and 
address specific issues such as “trespass, littering, wildfire 
prevention, weed control, camping, human waste disposal, and 
portaging.”512  In fact, the report opined that the Stream Access 
Law was a way of balancing private and public rights, with many 
landowners saying they can live with and support the Stream 
Access Law because there are provisions in the law that protect 
                                                 
510.  Id. at 7. 
511.  Id. at 8. 
512.  Id. at 10. 
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their private property interests.513   
XV. COMMENTARY  
 Both facts and the law matter.  In the odyssey of stream 
access in Montana, both have played significant, critical, and pivotal 
roles.  Without their inexorably intertwined combination, it is 
difficult to imagine the comprehensive and successful developments 
that have molded Montana’s Stream Access Law. First the facts, 
then the law.   
 On the Dearborn River and the Beaverhead River, 
landowners had decided to prohibit public floating and fishing, 
although the general public had floated and fished on each river for 
decades. The landowners had used intimidation, harassment, and 
physical barriers in their attempts to stop public use.  It is no 
surprise that the courts, state district courts and Supreme Court, 
would find a way to allow the public to continue to use these rivers.  
The surprise was how broad and firmly anchored in Montana 
constitutional law and the Public Trust Doctrine the decisions were. 
 The Curran and Hildreth decisions authored by Chief 
Justice Haswell, locked a public right to recreate on state water into 
the constitutional ownership of water for the use of its people 
secured by the state’s sovereign obligations required by the Public 
Trust Doctrine.  Therefore, these two decisions set the stage for 
legislation and judicial decisions that followed.  In theory the 
legislation was required to closely follow the Curran and Hildreth 
decisions and, if the legislative body did not do so, then the 
Supreme Court could or would make it right.  However, in a 
political world, the legislature in a conservative response could have 
attempted to undermine the courts decisions, hoping for a reversal.   
Nevertheless, the 1985 Legislature’s response was as unique 
and groundbreaking as the Supreme Court decisions. The 
compromise and collaboration of the alliance of recreationist 
groups and the alliance of landowner groups resulted in legislation 
that was faithful to the holdings of the Supreme Court. The 
                                                 
513.  Id. at 22. 
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recreationists gained clear and detailed protection of stream access 
rights while the landowner alliance gained protection of private 
property rights by prohibiting trespass outside of the bed and 
banks, e.g. no public right to cross private land or to establish 
prescriptive use easements, by prohibitions on the use of private 
ditches, and by limits on potential landowner liability for users of 
streams and rivers.  In many, if not all subsequent legislative 
sessions, the present Stream Access Law probably would not have 
passed resulting in a prolonged controversy. 
 As expected, opponents of the Stream Access Law would 
test the law both directly and by attempting to chip away at its 
margins.  The numerous attempts to challenge the Stream Access 
Law constitutionally as a taking without just compensation have 
failed with the courts finding that in setting the line between the 
rights of private landowners over whose land a publicly owned 
stream flows and the public’s right to use the stream, nothing was 
taken from the private landowners. 
 One of the issues that this author sees as potentially still not 
entirely resolved is the status of the strip between the high-water to 
low-water marks on navigable for title rivers.  The Galt I decision 
limited or qualified the public’s right to use the strip, as allowed in 
the original Stream Access Law language, without addressing 
whether Montana, in 1895 could have constitutionally and 
consistent with the Public Trust Doctrine, ceded ownership to 
riparian landowners. Or, when the fee title in the strip was ceded, 
what retained public use rights and state control in the form of an 
easement are required pursuant to the Constitution and the Public 
Trust Doctrine. 
 The controversy over the status of Mitchell Slough is a 
prime example of an attempt to chip away at the margins of the 
Stream Access Law by turning live river channels and streams into 
private fishing “ditches.” The Supreme Court in its 7-0 decision 
held Mitchell Slough was a natural water body subject to the right 
of the public to recreate under the Stream Access Law.  Legislative 
attempts to reverse the Mitchell Slough decision would have led to 
similar claims under similar circumstances to turn river channels, 
and even streams, into private “fishing ditches.” 
 Denying access to streams and rivers at county bridges was 
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another attempt to limit the public’s ability to use streams and 
rivers.  The Achilles heel of legislative bills to limit access as not 
qualifying as a public road purpose was the potential collateral 
damage to the ability of counties to expand the use of a county road 
as needed to support expanding public needs such at telephone 
lines, power lines, sewer lines, etc., without new easements that 
would be difficult or impossible to acquire or without expensive and 
lengthy condemnation. 
 The recent and prescient PLAA v. Madison County 
decision by the Supreme Court that county roads must have a 
broad range of potential uses under the umbrella of public road 
purposes benefits counties, road users, and recreationists.  The 
court applied this principle to roads created by dedication, petition, 
and public prescriptive use to hold that access to streams and rivers 
at county bridge crossings was a public road purpose.  The court 
held, however, that the width of a public prescriptive use road was 
to be determined based on the facts of historic use.  The case-by-
case determination will put counties in a practical difficulty.   
Many county roads look like and are administered just like 
petitioned or dedicated county roads -- they were just established 
by a sort of road wedlock.  In hindsight, a more practical, and 
probably just as legally justified, solution would be, or could 
eventually be, that the width of a county prescriptive road is 60 feet, 
the same default width as all other county roads, except subject to 
an acknowledge rebuttable presumption.  This would remove a 
cloud over the remaining uncertainty for county prescriptive roads 
and shift the focus to just the county roads where the width of the 
road may be a legitimate issue.   
 The management of public recreational use of rivers and 
streams by DFWP and the Commission has been successful, 
especially viewed from the vantage point of case-by-case, or stream-
by-stream, efforts.  DFWP has worked with landowners and 
recreationists to build fences at bridge crossings that meet the twin 
objectives of controlling livestock while facilitating safe and 
practical access to the underlying stream.  The Commission has 
functioned as a relief-valve by ruling on petitions to restrict stream 
access because of claimed resource harm or property damage, 
although in most circumstances the capacity of a stream has 
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functioned as a self-executing limitation.  Allocating recreational 
use, preserving the benefits of recreating in streams and rivers, and 
reducing conflicts has been and can be addressed in Commission 
rulemaking.  Portage routes have been handled in a low-key 
manner, generally by the face-to-face collaboration between 
landowners and DFWP field personnel. 
 A word of caution is appropriate.  Comprehensive public 
access has benefitted from favorable factual situations and 
corresponding favorable legislative and judicial responses.  
Supporters of stream access would be wise to appreciate that the 
reverse can happen.  Abuses of recreational access, such as littering, 
trespass, out-of-control dogs, or failures to respect the rights of 
private property owners, could lead to restrictions on stream access.  
One particular, potential example comes to mind.  If hunters use 
stream corridors as public access through private property to get to 
public land, this is not a stream access right.  If this abuse reaches a 
trigger level, the eventual legislative and judicial response will most 
likely not be to the liking of stream access proponents. 
 In summary, Montana Stream Access Law, while very 
broad, is also not complicated, has avoided lingering and divisive 
controversies, benefits from clear and straightforward statutory 
direction and limitations, and helps protect private property 
interests.  These reasons help explain its remarkable success over 
the past three decades.  Montana is fortunate compared to many 
neighboring states, from the perspective of supporters of stream 
access.  In Montana, if a person can legally access a stream, he or 
she can fish, whether floating or wading, as long as he or she stays 
within the ordinary high-water lines.  Public access is available from 
state and federal public lands, including fishing access sites 
provided by fee purchases or easements obtained by DFWP or 
federal agencies, at highway and county road bridge crossings or by 
permission of private landowners.   
 Recreationists owe a debt of gratitude to the 1984 Montana 
Supreme Court for its landmark decisions, authored by Chief 
Justice Haswell, that guarantee public stream access to all rivers 
and streams. They also owe a debt of gratitude to the 1985 
Legislature’s passage of the Stream Access Law that was the 
product of not only the members of the legislature but also the 
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unparalleled, collaborative support of strong and inclusive alliances 
of both landowners and recreationists, with the additional support 
of DFWP.  The result is an amazingly simple and straightforward 
law that codifies a public right to recreate in streams and rivers, but 
also carefully defines the limits of public access.  For landowners, 
the debt is to the collective wisdom of their alliance in honoring the 
Supreme Court decision while negotiating respect for and 
preserving the rights of riparian, private landowners within the 
language of the law. 
 The result is a Stream Access Law that works, has gained 
increasing respect, and has proven its value.  For thirty years the 
law has weathered constitutional challenges and attempts to 
undermine it by denying access from public road crossings and by 
defining live streams as ditches. These challenges have actually 
made the Stream Access Law stronger by ensuring that streams 
cannot become fishing ditches and by guaranteeing and enhancing 
access at public bridge crossings.  Citizen vigilance, support, and 
advocacy have been the crucial factors in preserving and 
strengthening the Stream Access Law.  
   
 
